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Abstract:
This thesis is focusing on the United Nations Quick Impact Projects, which were
officially established as part of the UN peacekeeping missions program through the
Brahimi report in 2004. Their primary purpose is to develop and strengthen the
relationship between the mission and the host population. Precisely, this analysis is
centering on the influence that improved relationships have on the effectiveness of a UN
mission. In order to do so, the structure of this research is based on a comparative
method, using interviews from the field and at the UN headquarters in New York City.
The purpose of such method is to gather substantive data to enable the establishment of a
first layer of evaluation. The study-cases are the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL) and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Other
participants to the interviews are from the United Nations civil affairs Office and the
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
Both the United Nations and the IR literature have lacked the analysis to evaluate the
correlation between the improvement of population trust and the increase of the mission’s
effectiveness. Therefore, this analysis demonstrates the reasons of the absence of such
framework and proposes recommendations to develop a first layer of structural
assessment.
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INTRODUCTION
“If we don’t act now and decisively, I will not exclude the possibility of a
genocide occurring.” 1 These are the words of Amada Dieng, United Nations Special
Adviser on the prevention of genocide, to describe the appalling scenario that occurred in
Central African Republic. Echoing this statement, France, the UN Security Council
president during January 2014 explained: “given the seriousness of the situation in the
Central African Republic, which may implode, the international community should lend
its immediate support to the African force.”2
One may think that this is the first time that the Central African Republic has
encountered such a fate, however, since its independence in 1960, 13 mandates were
developed from 1997 to 2013 to protect, secure and assist this country in its peace
process. Although mandates have been designed, and joint work with the African Union
(AU) and the UN have been established to protect this country from chaos, it seems that
peace never lasted long.
Peacekeeping operations have fundamentally been established by the United
Nations to assist in the peace process between conflicting parties and assure the
protection of civilians. However, since the terrible outcome of different UN missions in
the ‘90s, the peacekeeping operation mandates were enlarged to include broader actions.
As Diehl and Druckman say in their book Evaluating Peace Operations, “peace

1

Reuters, Friday November 1st 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/uscentralafrica-un-idUSBRE9A00Y120131101
2
Gérard Araud, December 2013, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreignpolicy-1/united-nations/french-presidency-of-the-un-7818/article/french-presidency-ofthe-un-18785
4

operations refer to the range of peace missions (traditional peacekeeping, robust
peacekeeping, peace-building, peace observation).”3
This analysis will focus on peace-building missions in countries that have
undergone intrastate conflict. The main goal of this type of mission is to assist countries
in rebuilding the institutional framework of their State to prevent them from falling back
into war. As one can imagine, peace-building missions are long-standing, sinuous and
complicated. The missions are asked to assist the State in restoring its authority through
the reinforcement of its public institutions. Similarly to the traditional peacekeeping
operations, peace-building missions cannot be set up without the full consent of the
parties involved. Marrack Goulding, in his article The Evolution of United Nations
Peacekeeping explains that the consent of the country can be a strength thanks to the
legitimacy it implies for the country mission, however it could easily turn into a
weakness if the government uses it as a reason not to follow the mission’s
recommendations or as a threat for the mission to lose its authorized existence.4
In 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan requested the establishment of a Panel in
order to address the challenges of the new era and to adequately promote peace by
improving the United Nations peace operation system. Lahkdar Brahimi, chairman of this
committee on UN Peace Operations replied to Kofi Annan that this endeavor has been
accomplished “to offer frank, specific and realistic recommendations for ways in which

3Diehl

Paul, Druckman Daniel, Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers Inc, 2010), 1.
4

Goulding Marrack, The evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, in International
Affairs, Vol. 69, No 3 (July 1993), p. 454.
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to enhance [the peace operation system] capacity.” 5 It also informs that the peace
operations were firstly military and now involves a growing civilian capacity. The
peacebuilding process is therefore aimed to “reassemble the foundations of peace and to
provide the tools for building a safe, strong and sustainable state.”6 In this attempt to
renovate the peacekeeping operation structure, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) were first
introduced in the Brahimi Report, which “recommended that a small percentage of a
mission’s first-year budget should be made available to the representative or special
representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund QIPs in its area of
operations, with the advice of the United Nations Country Team’s Resident
Coordinator.” 7 They “are small-scale, rapidly-implementable projects, of benefit to the
population.”8
Diehl and Druckman explain that previous research on evaluation of peace
operations “focus generally on the conditions for success rather than on the mechanisms
responsible for the outcome.” 9 This analysis will therefore concentrate on the QIPs
mechanisms and evaluate their impact on peace operation effectiveness.
QIPs are supposed to develop a climate of trust between different actors involved
in the peace process 10 : the host government, which has been tremendously weakened
during times of conflict, the missions, which needs to legitimate its presence, the
population, who have long been disillusioned and NGOs involved in the QIPs
implementation. They are also aiming at “attracting future voluntary support” and “might
5

Letter from Lahkdar Brahimi to Secretary-General Kofi Annan on August 17, 2000
United Nations, Report of the Panel on UN peace operations, 2000, paragraph 13, p. 3
7
United Nations Secretariat, Quick Impact Project, Policy Directive, 2013, 2
8
Ibid., 3
9
Diehl, Druckman, op. cit., 7
10
United Nations Secretariat, Quick Impact Project, Polict Directive, 2013, p. 3
6
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attract the attention of development and reconstruction donors.”11 Not only do the QIPs
attempt to develop strong relationships between different actors during the
implementation of the mandate requirements, they are also a springboard for future
voluntary donations. As the Henri L. Stimson Center report also details, the Quick Impact
Projects are applied to a variety of activities: education, sanitation, or the reconstruction
of public infrastructure such as prison or courts.12They could also be aimed at developing
structures to promote human rights, such as agricultural projects for prisoners reinsertion
or the construction of different rooms separating detainees given their age or gender.
While QIPs were officially created in 2004, no project evaluation of their impact
on effectiveness has been undertaken. More importantly, most of the interviewees who
participated in the discussion on QIPs explained that they had no idea how to assess the
population needs or the QIPs impact on the mission mandates. The goal of this thesis will
therefore be to call for the establishment of an assessment of the QIPs on the mission’s
effectiveness. The analysis starting point is to consider that by developing strong
relationships between different actors and stakeholders, QIPs assist the missions in
developing a stable environment for the mandate’s achievement. From this argument,
several questions are raised. What are the types of relationships discussed? How often
should the mission be in contact with the population to properly understand its needs? Is
there really an improvement in the population’s opinion with regards to the mission once
the QIPs are closed?

11

The Henri L. Stimson Center, Brahimi Report and the future of UN Peace Operations
(Washington DC: 2003), 56.
12
Ibid., 57.
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All these questions needs to be answered if the United Nations wishes to properly
establish a framework of evaluation of their Quick Impact Project’s impact. This analysis
will therefore attempt to construct a frame of inquiry in order to facilitate such
assessment material.
Although being a modest part of the UN missions’ budget, we can argue that QIPs
impact, if correctly implemented, can strengthen the chances of success of UN operations
by increasing the legitimacy of the United Nations mission and thus opening the dialogue
between the host government and the UN personnel. It could even develop other links of
partnerships which would further improved the mission’s effectiveness. Besides, through
the implementation of short-term projects such as QIPs, “the threat of withdrawal",
mentioned in Goulding’s work, could be minimized by the increase in the mission’s
short-term achievements. It could also develop trust by the population towards the
peacekeepers and facilitate their work, and lastly, on the long-term, they could create
opportunities for further financial support.
Consequently, this research study asks: how can we accurately measure Quick
Impact Project’s impact on the UN missions’ effectiveness?
The main hypothesis of this research is to prove that by strengthening good
relations between the actors working for the stabilization of peace and promoting future
economic support, QIPs genuinely improve the effectiveness of a peace operation.
However as it has been previously stated, no proper set of measurement have been
defined to prove such purpose. This project’s goals is understand the reasons of such
absence and establish a set of recommendations to facilitate the establishment of a
framework of evaluation.

8

In order to carry out this analysis, I will use practical sources such as reports from
the United Nations, reports from NGOs and I will perform interviews with United
Nations staff, both at the Headquarters and in the missions. With regards to the latter, an
analysis of the Quick Impact Projects influence on the mission effectiveness raises
different questions that could become the basis for interviews, as well as for the corpus of
my research13.
Apart from the interviews and the literature from the United Nations, I will also
use sources that have been published on the evaluation of peace operations in order to
substantiate my analysis based on a qualitative methodology. My research will not be a
single-case project, I will use three different missions in order to enable generalization
toward the implementation of this policy and its impact on peace operations success. Out
of these three, two are located in Africa (Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire) and one is located
outside the African continent, Haiti, which allows plurality in the type of cases and so
better legitimacy for this research. The literature will allow me to find a standard
framework to define the concept of success and failure of peace operations and to
accurately relate it to the effectiveness of QIPs in these missions.
With regards to the time period of the assessment, the QIPs are being
implemented during the first year of the mission in theory, however, as the research goes
on, it might be possible to observe an influence on a longer term. Besides, if QIPs are
known to be fast implemented, almost immediate, it also generate financial support and
develop a strong climate of trust, which can be assumed as impacts that go beyond the
simple year of operation.

13

See full set of questions in the appendix of this research
9

Finally, the study will follow a typical framework of analysis; a literature review
follows the introduction. Chapter 3 is the definition of terms used in the analysis, in order
to provide better visibility and understanding for the following chapters. Chapter IV will
consist in the presentation of the different study-cases, lastly the subsequent chapter is
aggregating the data collected in chapter 4 in order the reasons that makes the
establishment of the framework so problematic for the United Nations.

10

Chapter II: The literature Review
Refocusing the research: From Peacekeeping to Peace-building
Saira Mohamed sets her study on a structural level. Rather than wondering if a
peacekeeping mission achieved its mandate or failed in its attempt, she wonders whether
or not the peace-building process should stay under the authority of the Security Council.
She believes that the Trusteeship Council should be reformed to handle this new kind of
peace making. Indeed, as she explains, the peace operations diverged from traditional
military peacekeeping to now focus primarily on state-collapsing situations. The
interesting part of her research for this analysis lies in her attempt to separate
peacekeeping from peace-building, as she explained, “following the Cold War, the UN
embarked upon a new type of peace operation. The mandate of these missions extended
beyond matters of war and security and required UN peacekeepers to undertake a range
of civilian functions […].”14Mohamed details a recent evolution of peacekeeping where it
is no longer kept into the field of security and military, but it has evolved into a civilian
capacity where peace-making extends into state-building, even state-reinforcing.
Although, her research emphasizes the legitimacy of the Security Council, it reveals a
more precise topic than peacekeeping, the notion of peace-building, critical for our
research. Indeed, the narrowed topic of peace-building is extremely relevant to the Quick
Impact Projects analysis. These were established in the Brahimi report in order to address
the shortcomings of the traditional peacekeeping missions. More accurately, although

14

Mohamed Saira, From Keeping Peace to Building Peace : A proposal for a revitalized
United Nations Trusteeship Council, in Columbia Law Review, Vol. 105, No. 3 (Apr.,
2005) p. 809
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unofficial, the UN personnel have already taken such actions in the past 15, however, the
development of the Brahimi Report made official this type of procedure, enabling the
establishment of policies attached to the concept of building peace. Indeed, by focusing
on peacekeeping effectiveness, this analysis attempts to explore and assess the different
processes in which third-party missions assist the state in redefining its authority after it
has collapsed or has been consequently weakened. Furthermore, as defined during the
High Level Panel Report in 2004, “the core task of peace building is to build effective
public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society, can establish a consensual
framework for governing within the Rule of Law”.
Also, Hartzell, Hoddie and Rotchild talk about “stabilizing the peace” through the
reinforcement of the sustainability of the State 16 . If the State has lost its internal
sovereignty there is a high percentage of chance that peace will not last. A strong and
democratic state, to be differentiated with an authoritarian regime, is necessary to gain
the trust of the population and therefore achieve a stabilization of peace. Although this
article seems to only focus on the military and security aspect of a peace operation 17, two
facts are important for this study: the necessary democratization of the State in post civil
war conflict and the need for the government to gain the trust of the population in order
to become strong and sustainable. Indeed, these two variables reveal that Quick Impact
Projects by improving the well being of the population can benefit the mission and the
host government in gaining a climate of trust and therefore improve the overall

15

Documentary Sierra Leone: Rebuilding a Torn Society
Hartzell C., Hoddie M., Rotchild D., Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An
investigation of some Key Variables, in International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1 (winter
2001) pp 183-208
17
Ibid, pp192-193
16
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effectiveness of the UN country team in assisting the State to stabilize the peace on the
long run.
Again concerning peace building, Samuels’s work18 enlightens the scholarly field
by developing an empirical strategy based on the observations of shortcomings and
achievements that has been done in former peace operation such as Timor Leste or Haiti.
She focuses on three pillars: “political transformation, reform of the governance
framework, and the associated building constitutions through capacity transfer.”19 Diehl
and Druckman refers to former scholarly works to differentiate the “new peacekeeping”
concept taken from Ratner, or also characterized as “second-generation missions” by
Mackinlay and Chopra from the traditional peacekeeping which they characterizes by
their “core peacekeeping goals” 20 : “violence abatement”, “conflict containment” and
“conflict settlement”. What is important to bear in mind is that traditional peacekeeping
has not been replaced by the new form of peace operations, it has rather evolved into a
more complex structure and encompasses much more than the three goals previously
mentioned and therefore necessitates a new form of evaluation of effectiveness.
Lastly, the article There are peace-building tasks for everybody from Chaldwick
Alger is interesting because it attempts to discuss the “culture of peace” promoted by the
United Nations and the development of a multi-actor networks in peace-building
processes. In the case of Quick Impact Projects, the policy and the finance are led by the
United Nations, however it involves a plurality of actors which are described in Alger’s

18

Samuels K., Sustainability and Peacebuilding: A key Challenge, in Development in
Practice, Vol. 15, No. 6 (Nov., 2005) pp 728-736
19
ibid, p. 729
20
Diehl Paul, Druckman Daniel, Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers Inc., 2010) p. 29-31
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article: Non-governmental organizations, International organization, businesses, the
population and of course the host government. This article underlines the modernity of
policies such as QIPs which attempts to involve a plurality of actors in order to reach a
high level of effectiveness.

The need for a systematic analysis
The effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions is not a recent subject of analysis. Since
the end of the cold war, many academic researchers attempted to define the effectiveness
of such endeavors along with the UN itself which has produced many reports to assess its
achievements and shortcomings.
Mullenbach attempts to redirect the topic because “peacekeeping missions have
not been adequately examined.”21 He details the scope of these inadequate examinations
by describing the errors in their level of analysis. Many studies focused on the success or
failure of certain peacekeeping missions without achieving a proper level of
generalization. The limitation of these analysis reveals a larger issue when one examines
peacekeeping mission’s effectiveness; each conflict is different and therefore each
mission should be different. Therefore, focusing on the missions as the principle subject
of research could lead to a consequent error in the analysis. Attempting to explain the
failure or success of one mission will not necessarily be a tool for understanding those to
come. This is precisely the mis en garde enunciated by Mullenbach that this research
should follow. On the same topic, Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman attempt to define a
general framework of analysis in order to facilitate accurate assessment of the
21

Mullenbach Mark J., Deciding to Keep Peace: An analysis of International Influences
on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions, in International Studies
Quaterly, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Sep., 2005) p. 530
14

effectiveness of the United Nations peace operations while enabling a high level of
generalization. In order to do so, they established a “Decision-making Template
Approach”22 with five different steps. They explained that given the need to consider the
goals of the peace operations in order to achieve an adequate analysis, the identification
of primary goals23 becomes the basis of any research. In the case of this study, defining
the goals of Quick Impact Projects in a general scheme and then in a mission-specific
method becomes the foundation to properly assess their impact on the overall
effectiveness of their mission, and more broadly on their general influence regarding
peace operations.
On a practical basis, the United Nations provides annual report on the
achievement of particular missions. These documents assist the Security Council, which
is the principal body making the decision to launch, extend or close a UN peacekeeping
mission, in deciding whether or not a mandate should be extended, transformed or simply
closed. For this research purpose, it will provide data, and practical information in order
to enable the general evaluation.
In 2000, the Security Council, decided to produce a report, No exit without
strategy, in order to define the factors in which such actions are made. With regards to
this report, the President of the Security Council asked the Secretary-General of that time,
Kofi Annan, to produce a report on the factors that determine the success or failure of
peacekeeping missions. Annan explains the importance of uniqueness of each missions
and insists on “[…] both the restoration of mutual confidence and the rehabilitation that

22

Diehl Paul, Druckman Daniel, Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers Inc., 2010) p. 26
23
ibid, p. 25
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help make an agreed border and a negotiated peace work.” 24 Lastly, he refers to the
importance of coordination with other international actors or UN agencies. Quick Impact
Projects (QIPs) seem to match these expectations. QIPs policy and directive stipulate that
their purpose is to “[…] establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and
the peace process, thereby improving the environment for effective mandate
implementation.”25 Analyzing both academic and UN reports will enable this research to
balance between theoretical expectations of generalization and the practical necessity of
using case-by-case insight. This study will not necessarily focus on each mission but
rather observed the policies that United Nations have attempted to synchronize as a
general process of peacekeeping. In this case the Quick Impact Projects become a study
in the broader picture of the UN peacekeeping missions. The goal is to understand if the
UN Headquarters, where the policies are elaborated, properly assesses the requirements
for long-standing peace when there are such a high variety of subjects.
How my research adds to the field
Few or no research studies have been constructed to establish a framework of
evaluation for Quick Impact Projects. The bureaucratic system in which the United
Nations staff members have to work often makes it difficult for them to define concrete
steps, and understandings, to form proper criteria for assessment. The analysis undertaken
by this thesis research of different UN missions and their QIPs teams’ work underlines
the constraints the UN faces in establishing such a framework of evaluation. My research
discloses the work of the UN staff and the UN system used to propose, choose and
24

United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council: No Exit
Without Strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, April 20th 2001, p. 2
25
United Nations, DPKO/DFS policy directive (revised), 2013
16

implement QIPs. Most importantly, this project attempts to understand the reality of QIPs
and their goals when applied to the field. In the conclusion I offer recommendations on
the practice of QIPs, field evaluation by local residents, and the necessity to enlarge the
network of partnerships.

17

Chapter III: Methodology Employed for the evaluation of
Quick Impact Projects on Peacekeeping Operations:
This thesis is paved with a few challenges. This chapter uses different
methodological processes in order to avoid bias and therefore maximize the accuracy of
this research.
Challenge 1: Finding a good balance between generalization and particularity
This analysis is focusing on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), a policy elaborated by
the United Nations in order to maximize the effectiveness of its peacekeeping missions.
The policy directive stipulates that the QIPs should be funded and operated in the “area
of operation of the mission.”26 The semantic used in this directive is fundamental for the
correctness of this research. If the policy discusses the “area of operation”, it is logical to
assume that each mission have different areas of operation. Therefore, the first challenge
to this analysis is to enable generalization in the study of an issue that seems to be
functioning on a case-by-case basis. In order to do so, I am using previous academic
work that has attempted to raise a level of generalization in the evaluation of
peacekeeping missions. The core of this thesis is based on the evaluation framework
defined by Diehl and Druckman in their book Evaluating Peace Operations. I will
attempt to determine a general framework of “area of operations” in the rule of law
missions and observe if whether or not the QIPs have been able to achieve their goals and
consequently provided help in maximizing the country mission’s effectiveness. The
academic sources will thus assist this research in reaching a level of generalization while
respecting the singularity of each case.

26

United Nations Secretariat, Quick Impact Project, Policy Directive, 2013, 2
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The United Nations documents such as bi-annual or annual reports, policy
directives, and lesson-learned will help in determining the theoretical expectations of
QIPs and the reality of practice. Put together the scholarly works and the UN documents
will provide this research with a balance between generalization and singularity.
Challenge 2: Gathering information from people in the field
In order to be as impartial as possible to conduct this study, I decided to gather
information and personal opinions from interviews. The interview participants were
selected both at the Headquarters (Civilian Affair department) and on the ground
(Country teams in Haiti, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and in the recently
deployed mission in Mali). The goal of such interviews is to distinguish the theory taken
from the UN documents and the scholarly work and the reality of the field. Two types of
interviews were directed: face-to-face and via email. It was difficult for a Master thesis to
travel and meet the UN personnel on the ground, this is the reason why part of the
interviews had to be done through Internet rather than in person.
The main issue when it came to gather the information from people on the ground
is that the questions were often fastly answered and
Unfortunately one of the shortcomings of this thesis is to have been unable to
gather information from the population in the country, the Non-governmental
organizations working in the field and from the government hosting the mission. A more
advanced study, on a longer time frame would enable me to travel and meet with the
people on the field in order to maximize visibility and impartiality. The QIPs imply a
plurality of actors and I acknowledge the limitations of this collection of information.
Lastly, the other issue raised by the missing interviews from other stakeholders does not

19

represent the fact that “ these actors often have different goals or different priorities or
assign different priorities to shared goals”27 as Diehl and Druckman emphasize in their
book.
Challenge 3: Maximizing neutrality, avoiding bias
Jeremy Farral explains that the problem of drawning upon data from United
Nations reports is that these documents often lack neutrality 28 . Not that the United
Nations is purposely biased but it is important to bear in mind that in order to keep the
financial support from the member states, agencies and offices of the UN often have to
emphasize their achievements rather than their shortcomings. As I was interning for one
of the component of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, I realized that
the member states' expectations were often higher than the possibility of actions from the
UN personnel. Therefore, in order to avoid subvention cuts, these services had to present
a positive front and focus on their successes. Once again, this is not done on purpose but
rather it is a systemic problem inside the United Nations structure that should be assessed
while doing research on a UN endeavor. In order to do so, I decided to gather information
from the scholarly field and from the UN, the former would bring some neutrality to the
latter. I also decided to get information from Non-governmental Organization reports,
hoping that it would highlights information that would not necessarily appear in the
international organization documents.

27

Diehl Paul, Druckman Daniel, Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers Inc., 2010) p. 12
28
Farral Jeremy, Recurring Dilemmas in a Recurring Conflict: Evaluating the UN
Mission in Liberia (2003-2006), in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No 3-4 (2012) p.
311
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I want to insist on the fact that for six months I observed the work done at the
Secretariat and I was amazed by the passion and the hard-working mentality of the staff.
Their anxiety regarding financial support is a down side of this system and should not be
interpreted as a lack of competence, quite the contrary. Again, in order to adequately
assess UN works on the ground and at the Headquarters, one should be aware of that
financial pressure that hangs on every service of this institution. Moreover, one should
acknowledge the disparity between the high expectations and the lack of capacities
(financial, staff…) attached to a mission. For instance, in the case of rule of law area of
operation, the United Nations member states often expect rapid changes when the reality
is often long and sinuous. The QIPs have been introduced to address these problems and
provide fast improvement to a long-process mission. Studying the capacity for QIPs to
achieve such goals is also a way for this research to determine whether the United
Nations have been able to address this long-standing issue.

21

Chapter IV: Defining Terms
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a definition of
effectiveness but also to give a clear explanation on the whys and wherefores of United
Nations Quick Impact Project. Effectiveness of peacekeeping missions is a complicated
matter since it implies a range of area of operations and stakeholders. If peace agreements
are respected and disarmament has been agreed upon, the rule of law area might be
running behind in their objectives. Therefore, in order to properly determine the concept
of effectiveness, it is essential to first define the assessed activities.
This research centers its observations on the rule of law area of operations. More
precisely, it focuses on the re-establishment or creation of Justice and Correctional
institutions in post-conflict situations in Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and
Haiti. The impact of the Quick Impact Projects with regards to these two components of
the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions will be the dependent variables, while
the effectiveness of the peace operation being impacted by these projects will define the
independent variable of this study.
The Quick Impact Projects
On March 7 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan required a high-level panel on
the future of Peacekeeping Operations whose aim has been to adequately assess the
shortcomings of the UN missions. The formal introduction of the Quick Impact Project
was included in the report of this reformation process. Different criteria could describe
the Quick Impact Project, and since its first introduction as a UN policy it has
encountered some evolution in order to match the reality of the field.

22

In 2007, a Quick Impact Project policy directive has been devised to define the
nature, scope, value and duration of the projects. In the policy, QIPs are “small-scale,
rapidly-implementable projects, of benefit to the population.” 29 They are used by the
peacekeepers in order to create a climate of trust and confidence about the mission, its
mandate and the overall peace process. Therefore, they are supposed to “improve the
environment for effective mandate implementation”30
The Quick Impact Projects have three general criteria of impact: First, it is
supposed to promote acceptance of the mandated tasks. Secondly, it should be building
confidence in the peace process and building support through the demonstration of early
achievements. Thirdly, it might generate support for the mission.31 In theory, if QIPs are
properly implemented, these steps should be appearing in the establishment of quickly
implemented initiatives, and the mission should be able to develop longer-term projects
without risking losing the confidence of the host population and therefore avoiding to
notice the development of a negative climate. As sum up below, the QIPs should
encompass the characteristics as presented in the 2013 revised policy32:
.

10.1 small-scale and low-cost;

.

10.2 designed to be of benefit to the population;

.

10.3 planned and implemented within a short-time frame;

.

10.4 of a non-recurrent nature, and do not place an unforeseen financial burden
on the recipient or create material requirements that cannot be met within
the country;

29 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, QUICK IMPACT
PROJECTS Policy Directive, 12 February 2007, p 2.
30
ibid
31
ibid, p2-3
32
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support,
QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS Revised Policy, January 2013.
23

.

10.5 usually visible to the population;

.

10.6 done in consultation with representatives of national or local authorities,
and, where appropriate, with the participation of local communities;

.

10.7 done in consultation with relevant UN actors, and not duplicative of the
programmes of UNCT or other actors;

.

10.8 selected in an impartial and transparent manner;

.

10.9 sensitive to considerations of gender, ethnicity, age and vulnerability;

.

10.10 selected and implemented in accordance with the principles of ‘Do No
Harm’

.

10.11 sensitive to any potential risks to the population, including risk of
conflict or risk of damage to the environment
The analysis and evaluation of the three study-cases will enable this research to

observe the good implementation of these characteristics and thus conclude if when
properly implemented Quick Impact Projects can have a positive impact on the overall
mission effectiveness.
The Quick Impact Projects are initially implemented during the mission’s first
year, however, in some cases such as with regards to the mission in Sierra Leone, the
General Assembly recommended that the QIPs budget should be extended to the second
year of the mission. In the 2011 QIPs Lessons learned study, it is recommended that the
duration of implementation should be extended to the second year of the mission in order
to avoid delays. Also, for each project a timeframe of three months is mentioned in the
policy but not in a compulsory manner. The lessons learned document therefore
recommended the extension to a six-month timeframe for each project to be
implemented. As the document stipulates, “increase implementation timeframe in the
Policy Directive to a recommended maximum of six months, to allow a more realistic
24

period for project implementation, whilst retaining the defining characteristic of QIPS as
projects that are ‘rapidly implementable.’
With regards to the financial characteristics, QIPs must represent a very small
amount of the entire mission’s budget. As an illustration, in the 2013-2014 peacekeeping
mission budget, QIPs represented 0.87% of the MINUSTAH whole budget and 0.21% of
the UNMIL budget.33

The Quick Impact Projects are broadly defined to have a positive impact on the
wellbeing of the population. In the case of the rule of law area of operations, QIPs are
funded to develop capacity-building. Indeed in the lessons learned study, QIPs should be
differentiated from humanitarian action to avoid “be[ing] viewed as an unwelcome and
ill- considered incursion into humanitarian space by military or by mission actors.” 34
Therefore, to avoid any confusion with other UN structure work, QIPs are implemented
on three major pillars with regards to Rule of Law sector: Human Rights and
Livelihoods, Security, and institutional capacity and infrastructure. One can imagine that
these three sectors of action are profoundly intertwined, and a deeper analysis of QIPs in
each study-case will be provided in the following chapter.
Defining Effectiveness
Evaluating the effectiveness of a mission has always been tedious. Scholars
have often concentrated their work towards the notion of “success” or “failure” and the
factors influencing such outcomes. Mullenbach has an interesting point of view since he
33
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starts his discussion by stipulating: “In fact, the success or failure of a third-party
peacekeeping mission may at least partly be influenced by the initial decision to establish
or not establish the mission.” 35 Indeed, the first angle to define effectiveness is to
understand why the mission came to existence. If one acknowledges the goal of the
mission, it becomes easier to assess its achievements.
Secondly, Diehl and Druckman explain, “it is rare that any peace operation is
uniformly a success or a failure. For an assessment to be accurate, it is essential to
observe and evaluate the different dimensions of the mission and base the analysis on the
achievements of their respective goals. For example, UN mandates might set up a list of
objectives; however, the different stakeholders on the ground might have different
priorities or expectations from the mission.
In this case, the observation of Quick Impact Projects will attempt to analyze if
the work of the UN staff has been facilitated through the improvement of their relations
with the population, the government and the NGOs. That is to say, the purpose of this
research is to determine if the amelioration of relations on one hand and the prospect of
future financial support on the other hand consequently benefited the UN staff in doing a
better work and achieving what the mandate has stipulated with regards to rule of law
issues. Again, the basis for this analysis is to understand if the Quick Impact Projects
have a positive impact on the UN mission’s work, which in the long term would enable
them to stabilize and strengthen the rule of law institutions in the host countries.

Mullenbach Mark J., Deciding to Keep Peace: An analysis of International Influences
on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions, in International Studies
35

26

Chapter V: The United Nations Organization Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo –
MONUSCO
MONUSCO Background:
MONUSCO was not the first UN operation engaged in Congo. Two preceded the latest
one, starting in July 1960 with the ONUC, after the outbreak of a civil war following the
independence of the former colony.
The purpose of this first international intervention was to assist the newly created
Congolese government in strengthening its public authority through the reinforcement of
rule of law institutions. Its primary function was then extended to “maintaining the
territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of
civil war and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory
personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries” 36 In his book
entitled The theory and practice of peacekeeping, Indar Jit Rikhye underlies the collapse
of the entire state structure that required the involvement of UN technical assistance and
its direct military action to assist this sovereign power in restoring law and order
throughout its territory. He further explained that the Democratic Republic of Congo,
which was administered by the Belgians during the colonial era, did not have an educated
leadership that could have been able to stabilize the public infrastructure in their newly
independent country. “But the Belgians had not created any indigenous leadership, as the
British had done in their colonies; nor had they established a cadre of évolués (highly
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educated Africans), as the French had done. Within a few days of Independence the
whole administrative infrastructure had disappeared amid chaos and bloodshed.”37
Although rapidly established in the country, the ONUC was confronted to several
political issues that tremendously hampered the mission’s capacity to work.
Hammarskjöld was challenged by the September constitutional crisis that occurred when
Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister, annoyed by the UN’s refusal to deal with the
Katanga insurrection by force, decided to undertake such mission’s by himself. The
intervention was highly contested by the President Kasavubu, who used the principle of
Loi Fondamentale to destitute the Prime Minister from his function and replaced him by
the Senate President, Jospeh Ileo. The political crisis reached another cataclysmic level
when Colonel Mobutu, the army Chief of Staff, lead a coup which evicted Kasavubu,
Lumumba and Ileo’s from the political scene.
As Rikhye concludes, ONUC was a new form of peacekeeping, working in the
middle of a civil war. After the dismantlement of its territory into 4 political spheres only
ONUC has been able to reunify this sovereign power into one single political unit.
Peacekeeping was therefore not only based on keeping peace through military separation
of forces, although ONUC was also mandated to do so, it worked into political chaos in
order to stabilize peace, which was threatened by political and ideological warfare.
The second and third UN operations in Congo go hand in hand. The United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo was established in
30 November 1999 through the resolution 1279 following the implementation of the
Lusaka ceasefire agreement. This operation was strictly based on security and
Rikhye Indar Jit, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping, London: C. Hurst and Co
Publishers, 1984, p82
37
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humanitarian issues and did not include any mandated task with regards to State building.
Its main purposes were to observe the correct implementation of the ceasefire, monitor
the disengagement of violence while providing assistance to the displaced persons,
refugees and children and support the protection of human rights and the right of
children38. After reaching a new phase of peace building, MONUC became the United
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(MONUSCO) through the Resolution 1925 on May, 28 2010, in order to assist the state
intensively in developing a stable and strong public authority throughout the country and
to emphasize the importance of rule of law institutions yet recognizing the importance of
security with regards to civilians and the necessary cessation of all armed conflicts
especially in the Kivus and Orientale Province. This new mandate enlarged consequently
the work of the UN personnel to civilian affairs in assisting the state to develop a stable
and peaceful environment. Martin Kobler, the Special Representative to the SecretaryGeneral reported to the Security Council in August 2014 during the Great Britain’s
presidency. He firstly discussed the different issues that MONUSCO and the DRC
government had to deal with since their last report: the M23 crisis, followed by the Allied
Democratic Forces (ADF) crises which caused 66,000 Congolese to flee their homes and
finally the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) attacks in Eastern
DRC. He then explained that as of today, through the joint work with the Forces Armées
de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) the M23 rebel groups has been
dismantle, the FDLR strongly weakened and the ADF and FDLR had voluntarily agreed

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1279: S/RES/1279, 30 November 1999.
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to a disarmament process. 4000 rebels from various groups have surrendered, 500,000
Internally Displaced Persons have returned to their homes and thanks to the Nairobi
declaration the process of rehabilitation is underway. However, as Martin Kobler
expressed it, the situation is still fragile and the Mutarule massacre where 33 people died
with the inaction of a MONUSCO contingent a few kilometers created a consequent gap
in the confidence that the mission has been trying to build with the Congolese population.
SRSG Martin Kobler personally took responsibility for the inaction; the commander has
been relieved from his leading responsibility and an internal investigation is in process in
order to raise accountability for nonintervention. Lastly, Martin Kobler recommended for
a “paradigm shift” in the MONUSCO work through three core actions: “reaction to
prevention”, “static to mobile”, “and protection by presence to protection by action”39.
Martin Kobler also discussed the necessary increase in military engagement, being the
priority in Eastern Congo in order to put a final stop to the FDLR’s action. More stability
is thus perceived as the development of multiple opportunities for the well-being of the
Congolese population, such as market’s development, farm works, education… This
prospect of an effective society can only be envisaged if rebel groups are forced to
disarm. The Security Sector Reform is still considerably slow but joint works with the
government are underway. Finally, with regards to the role in assisting the government
with Human Rights and democratic practices establishment, MONUSCO has been
monitoring the opposition’s ability to freely express their opinions. The mission also
works cooperatively with the government to ensure that all political decisions are
constitutionally correct and therefore prevent undemocratic practices to occur.
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general idea in the political stabilization facilitated by MONUSCO is based on the
reconciliation of political differences through the development of an inclusive and
comprehensive dialogue, which would establish free, fair elections and therefore enhance
further stability in the whole territory.
As a conclusion, we can understand that MONUSCO is different from the two
precedent mission as it requires the UN personnel to undertake processes in order to
stabilize the country not only on a security matter but also as a process of
democratization, and social reintegration of the former armed forces. Therefore, it is
interesting to evaluate the role played by QIPs in such endeavor. The following part of
this chapter will list and gives detailed information on the different QIPs action that have
been established and their impact on the overall mandated tasks of MONUSCO.
MONUSCO Quick Impact Project Initiatives:
In March 2015, the Secretary General’s report on MONUSCO came out. As a
consequence, the new resolution 2211 published by the Security Council dedicated a
chapter on “Gender issues, child protection, and interaction with civilian population.”
This part encourages MONUSCO to further strengthen their interaction with civilians in
order “to raise awareness and understanding about its mandate and activities.”40 The
Security Council therefore recognizes the ultimate importance of bonding with the
population in order to facilitate the work for MONUSCO. The resolution also focuses on
the importance of creating strong public relations; In other words, it states that trust is a
highly effective way to obtain reliable information on human rights violation or abuses
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and to identify potential threats.41 The role of QIPs is therefore significant for this new
mandated year, as its main purpose is to assist the mission in developing strong relations
with the populations through the achievement of small, fast-paced projects.
The resolution also demands MONUSCO to operate serious structural reforms in
order to make the mission more adequate to respond to its new challenges. In this
changing dynamic, it became highly difficult to obtain data from the QIPs team, as their
working group has been experiencing important changes since the end of 2014. Although
they kindly accepted to participate, the responsibility of answering the questionnaire was
being passed around to different UN personnel and a long time passed before the
questionnaire came back. V 42 was the staff member who kindly participated to be
interviewed, however she specified that her recent arrival at MONUSCO QIPs unit would
make it difficult for her to answer core questions on MONUSCO’s experience on QIPs
implementation.

V. has worked since 2005 in the Department of Peacekeeping

Operations. She spent five years in Haiti as a civil affairs officer and was moved to
MONUSCO. She both worked at the mission’s headquarters and the regional offices
(Kindu and Bukavu). Since September 2014, she has been re-assigned to MONUSCO
HQ in Goma as a QIPs program manager in the QIPs Unit, under the authority of the
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) for rule of law.
In order to present MONUSCO’s QIPs initiatives, this chapter will be subdivided
into four parts: the first part will focus on the objectives of QIPs in the recently reformed
MONUSCO’s perspective. Second, the categories and actors will be presented, which
will be followed by the implementation cycle based on MONUSCO’s Standard Operating
41
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Procedure (SOPs) and the last part of this analysis will center on the critical aspect of
MONUSCO’s use and purpose of QIPs initiative.

MONUSCO QIPs Major Objectives
In the first part of her responses, V. focused on the objectives defined by the QIPs
unit for the year 2014/201543. The first part concerns the planning and implementation
plan of the approved QIPs for the financial year of 2014/2015, which has allocated
$7,000,000. Within the allocation of this year budget, 75% of the $7,000,000 has to be
focusing on a new concept of “Islands of Stabilities”44 and to support the restoration of
state authorities. The concept of Island of Stabilities will be further detailed in the last
part of this chapter. As in many other UN missions, their purpose is not only to maintain
peace, but first and foremost, to strengthen the public authority in order to assure longlasting stability. Therefore, developing strong and effective public institutions becomes a
UN priority, which by extent, falls into the QIPs mandate. In the case of MONUSCO rule
of law, it means working closely with public officers in order to assist them in
refurbishing public institutions, building strong relations with representatives of the
public force (police, justice…) and assure that the population feels confident in their
political and security representatives.
The second part of the major objectives relates to the revision and monitoring of
the effectiveness of implementation of QIPs Standard of Procedures. In order to
efficiently proceed in the achievements of projects, QIPs unit has to follow a strict
procedure that is summed up in their Standard Operating Procedure, based on the policy
43
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and guidelines published by the UN headquarters. The new MONUSCO SOPs, according
to V., has been implemented with delay due to the redeployment of staff and the general
structural reforms that MONUSCO undertook in the end of 2014. The SOPs are the main
tool used by the QIPs team to select, implement and monitor projects.
The third part concerns the closure of the projects for the financial year
2013/2014. During the past years the Board of Auditors and the OIOS/audits have
produced reports of the achievements and their recommendations for QIPs. One of the
goals for this coming financial year is to implement the different directions given by
these two monitoring entities. Lastly although staying in the same dynamic, the QIPs
team is also expected to produce report for this financial year.
These different goals are set up in order to organize QIPs unit’s work for one
year. They might evolve given the reality of the field but this is what is expected of them
for the 2014/2015 financial year.
The other general tasks are about “managing QIPs.” In this regards, V. explains
that the “QIP unit at MONUSCO is responsible to support 9 Head of Regional Offices
and the QIPs focal points to identify and implement QIPs in the sectors.”45
Stakeholders and categories of QIPs
Curiously, when V. answered the question on the stakeholders, she only
mentioned the UN services and agencies. She made no comment on the population, the
government and NGOs contrary to the other mission who gave more importance to the
non-UN organs. The fact that she works at the HQ and not at the regional office might
explain her brief answer. Indeed, her unit might be more involved at the upper level of
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the QIPs structure, that is to say, they are in touch with UN services and agencies to
assure that the QIPs initiated are not overlapping with other UN initiatives, but they do
not necessarily interact with the other stakeholders that are usually working at the other
side of the QIPs structure. This unit is also directly in contact with the different focal
points at the regional offices, who are dealing with the QIPs implementation. Indeed, she
explained in one of her answers that: “QIPs unit is only very seldom in contact with the
population as the QIPs identification and implementation is managed in the sectors and
QIPs team hardly have the capacity to visit the beneficiary. First time I will go in the
field since September is to follow up implementation next week.”46
The way in which V. answered the question on stakeholders also reflects that she
might have interpreted stakeholders as UN’s partners more than concrete actors coming
from different sectors (public, private, governmental, non-governmental, civil society…).
In her answer, she says: “once the QIPs unit receives QIPs proposal from the sectors, the
QIPs unit check with UN agencies for duplication and also for advice”47. She doesn’t say
much about who are the actors who have submitted proposals, certainly because it is not a
priority for her team to know where it comes from, this being the responsibility of the
“sector” or region. Her team’s priority is to make sure that the proposals are realistically
feasible according to the QIPs criteria or do not duplicate an already existing project. She
also mentions the importance of checking with “the area of responsibilities.” 48 These
scopes of responsibility will enable them to get in touch with the agencies in charge of a
domain in which a QIPs proposal falls. Thanks to these divisions of task, they are able to
46
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ask for advice from experienced actors that first will inform them if their projects is not
already undertaken. Secondly, if there is no overlapping, they will be able to participate
and bring knowledge to the construction of the project, therefore facilitating the process
of implementation.
The different agencies listed by V. are International Organization for Migration,
UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP and the Stabilization Unit (SSU). In her listing of QIPs
categories she does not say much about Migration and Refugee assistance, however, in
her listing of partners she both mentions the OIF and UNHCR that shows that assistance
to displaced population is an important focus in MONUSCO QIPs.
She also states the importance of collaboration and support in the QIPs. Here
again, the circulation of information between the different agencies not only avoids loss
of time and overlapping but it enables the different actors to support each other’s work in
order to become as effective as possible.
The implementation cycle49
The first part of the Standard Operating Procedure states that “these SOP are in
line with the DPKO/DFS Policy on Quick Impact Projects approved on 21 January 2013
and mandatory for all staff engaged in the identification, selection, approval,
implementation, monitoring, closure and evaluation of QIPs.”50 Therefore the SOP is the
principal tool with which the QIPs unit and the focal points in charge of implementation
and monitoring will have to follow in order to adequately undertake the projects. This
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document starts with a reminder taken from the policy on the nature and scope of the
QIPs which states the value and duration, the purpose etc… Then, it focuses on the
“selection and design of the QIP proposals,” in which it explains that the senior officer of
each component (police, civilian or military) will assign a “project officer” who will
become the focal point regarding any issue on project design, implementation and
monitoring of progress.51 This part never refers to the criteria for the project officer to be
selected. This falls into the quality of judgment and experience of the senior officer to
select the best-fitted staff for the position. For instance, V. has been contacted by the
Chief of civil affairs in GOMA who offered her to become Manager of the QIPs unit,
which is consisted of 4 national staff (2 National-provided officers, two assistants) and
herself (international staff). Once the responsible staff and focal point are selected, they
are expected to present a proposal summary to the Head of Office who will check with
the Mission priorities and the provincial work plan. The UN staff in the country team is
“encouraged” by the UN HQ through the SOP to “seek out implementing partners to
advance Mission mandate priorities.”52 The list of implementing partners include: UN
agencies, other international organizations, national and international NGOs, local
organizations, local authorities and government and state institutions. The document also
specify that commercial contractors cannot be considered as a potential implementing
partner53.
The following section focuses on the legality of the implementing partners that
needs to be registered and recommended by the local authorities or the local chiefs.
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Consequently, the mission is expected to create a list of reliable and potential
implementing partners.
The next step is on the creation of the Quality Assurance Management Team
(QAM), which entity will review and advise on QIPs. The Head of Office is in charge to
establish such team and will designate a focal point whose task will be to organize QAM
team meetings. According to the SOP, the QAM team shall include: senior components
representatives, the Field Administrative Officer and Field Financial Officer,
representatives from the Stabilization Support Unit, Gender or HIV/AIDS Unit. In the
same chapter, the QAM team responsibilities are listed going from making sure that the
proposals fits the QIPs criteria as enounced in the policy, assuring the usefulness of the
project to the population it targets, establish logistical estimation for the construction of
the projects, provides a detailed budget, to manage the land ownership of the QIPs site to
assure access to the project officer, and making sure that the time frame is feasible as
stated in the QIPs policy.
The following part centers on the establishment of the Project Review Committee
(PRC) in which the DSRSG will chair. The DSRSG designates the Chief of Office as the
chairperson of the PRC. The PRC will be composed of the following members: DSRSG,
Director of Mission Support, Force Commander, Chief of Staff, Police Commissioner,
Chairs of Stabilization and Protection Tasks Force and Gender or HIV/ Aids Section
representative. The Chief of Office is expected to supervise the QIPs unit and the latter
will serve as the secretariat of the PRC. The responsibility of the PRC range from
selecting and approving project based on the budget available for QIPs, endorsing the
allotments and guidance provided to the field offices, reviewing the project proposals and
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reviewing the annual QIPs evaluation. In summary, it is in charge of doing what does not
fall under the QAM team responsibilities. Sub-paragraphs state that the PRC’s decisions
are made by majority vote and every deliberation should be recorded and prepared by the
QIPs unit within 5 days of each PRC meeting.
The next section focuses on the creation of “Memorandum of Understanding”
(MOU) for each approved project. Once the PRC has the approved projects, the QIPs unit
will have to initiate the next steps of the implementation process regarding commitment
of funds, signature of MOU if necessary and prepare the first installment. If a non-UN
body undertakes the implementation, the QIPs unit will have to produce a MOU in
cooperation with the project officer in the field, which will be signed between the mission
and the implementing partner.
The financial process includes the commitment of funds and the disbursement of
installments. The QIPs program officer is in charge of obtaining the Budget Section
Clearance, the DMS certification and the Finance Section/Accounts Unit approval in
order to get the commitment number. Once the latter is received, the QIPs program
officer will submit the first installment request to the Finance unit in order for the field
finance officer to receive the first payment. Because there is no bond or bank guarantee,
the SOP advises MONUSCO staff to limit the first payment to a maximum ranging from
$15,000 to $25,000 for projects that would exceed $35,000 of total budget. For the same
financial security reasons, the second and third installment should be based on project
advancement. The last part of this section states that “exceptional cases,”54 identified by
the DMS office based on the Head of Office’s recommendations, could lead to the
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disbursement of a bigger first installment. The finance officer is responsible for ensuring
that the financial aspects of QIPs are correctly monitored and that a financial report is
submitted through the Head of Office.
Next to the financial disbursement part, the implementation and monitoring
section explains that the project officer will ensure the completion of the projects
however the agreed time-frame is defined by the PRC. The monitoring visit needs to be
reported, and such report has to be sent to the QIPs unit. The designation of an
appropriate project officer is the responsibility of the Head of Office and the responsible
section. This part also mentions the necessity for the Public Information Division and the
Public Information officers to adequately publicize the QIPs in order to maximize
visibility and therefore the confidence-impact of each project on the targeted population.
Lastly, the report encourages the mission to organize monthly meeting in order to discuss
the implementation progress, and if any discuss challenges and possible ways to address
them. These briefing should be reported to the QIPs unit so the latter can produce a report
on monitoring and evaluation and further improved the guidance for implementing QIPs
based on field experience.
The final part of the SOP report states the importance of an appropriate closure
and evaluation of QIPs. Therefore, it is expected of the project officer to organize a site
visit and to fill in the “Project Closure and Evaluation Form” which s/he will then submit
to the QIPs unit program officer. The implementing partner should also produce a report
that should be submitted a week after the final site visit. Following the administrative
reporting, the project officer, in collaboration with the Head of Office, should organize a
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“hand-over ceremony” with the presence of relevant local authorities and the
MONUSCO PI component.
At the beginning of each new fiscal year, the QIPs unit program manager, with
the office of the DSRSG should produce an evaluation report on the previous year. The
annual evaluation is supposed to include: “a statistical overview of mission mandate
priorities advanced through QIPs funds, an overview of Management QIPs program, the
impact of QIPs program, best practices, lessons-learned, recommendations and
observations.”55 This report brings closure to the previous year however, it could also
become a very effective tool to improve the effectiveness in the management of QIPs by
providing visibility on challenges and achievements and to leave space for field officers
to make observations about their work and therefore facilitate communication between
the headquarters and the field.
Use and Purpose of QIPs
The policy and the guidelines insist that the QIPs’ primary focus must be on
building confidence. The MONUSCO SOP sums it up in three goals: “promoting
acceptance of the Mission’s mandated tasks, contributing to building confidence in the
peace building process and contributing to improving the environment for effective
mandate implementation.”56 When selecting QIPs, the proposals should include at least
one of the three goals to become relevant and potentially accepted. The QIPs at
MONUSCO are therefore used to ensure the effectiveness of the overall mission, to
facilitate the work of the UN staff by developing a stable and confidence-focus system on
which they could build long-term projects. Indeed, as the most recent Security Council
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resolution encourages MONUSCO, confidence building should become a priority if
MONUSCO wants to observe changes in the populations’ opinion of their work and thus
facilitate the stabilization process, which is one of the larger goal of the Mission.
V. explained in her answers that the main purposes of this fiscal year at
MONUSCO was in the “restoration of state authorities and Islands of Stability.”57Indeed
according to her 75% of the funds goes to support in creation of islands of stability.
Islands of stability are based on the new directives given by the Security Council on the
importance of stabilization. In the resolution 2098 of March 2013, the Security Council
created the “Force Intervention Brigade,” a first offensive strategy led by MONUSCO to
force peace into areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its primary goal, in
cooperation with the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
(FARDC), is“neutralizing and disarming small groups” as stated in the paragraph 12b of
the resolution.58 The QIPs are now taking the same directions towards these islands of
stability where, once the areas are being cleared of armed groups, stabilization activities
should be put in place. However, an activist at Oxfam was warning last year of these
islands of stability which, by focusing on only one purpose, the neutralization of armed
groups, tend to put other critical issues on the side. 59 She further criticizes the nonsustainable characteristic of these “short-lived military victories.”60 According to Cooper,
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the greatest threat emerging from these islands of stabilities is the creation of confusion
between humanitarian aid and the MONUSCO political agenda.
This critique underscores the importance for QIPs to focus on these islands in
order to bring confidence in the military offensive led by MONUSCO. As stated in the
SOP, QIPs become a tool for the mission to “promote acceptance, contribute to building
confidence and improve the environment for effective mandate implementation.”
Moreover, V. mentions in her answers the importance of implementing QIPs based on a
sustainable structure: “many QIPs have a component of sustainability and request
establishing so called “monitoring committees.”61 However, she does not clearly explain
how this scope of sustainability is really established. Indeed, she further says, “but in
general no major follow up is done after QIPs.”62 She therefore accepts that there is no
proper connection between the moment the QIP is being implemented and its longevity
on the long term. It is important to bear in mind that it is not because a project is
implemented short-term that it should have short-term longevity, however MONUSCO
QIPs in their SOP strictly explains that the future of the project will not be MONUSCO’s
responsibility but the implementing partners’. This issue of sustainability might create
tension if the projects, holding promises of confidence and trust, happen to be abandoned
by the mission.
The MONUSCO QIPs, as observed in other missions, are confronted with the
problem of connecting short-term implementation and long-term longevity of projects.
Indeed, after the final evaluation that occurs following the closure ceremony, it seems
that the bond between the mission and the project is neutralized and the mission could no
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longer be held responsible for its future. It is therefore important for the mission to bring
visibility to its role, and what the population should expect from it. If there is confusion
in what is expected of the mission, there will be more room for tension and the climate of
trust built during the implementation process will be ruined. This is an issue that should
be properly assessed in order to determine whether or not the confidence environment is
correlated to the short-term nature of the project implementation.
Another

important

aspect

of

the

implementation

of

QIPs

is

the

bureaucratic environment in which UN personnel have to work. Although V. is a UN
staff member working for the QIPs unit, she only has been to the QIPs site once or twice.
She is caught in an administrative structure which prevents her and her colleagues from
implementing the public relations goals which are the purpose of these projects. There
does not seem to be any feedback from the local people on the confidence building
impact of the projects.
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Chapter VI: UNMIL – United Missions Mission in Liberia
UNMIL Background:
Liberia entered in a cycle of violence when in 1980 Samuel Doe organized a coup
d’état with a group of 17 young army officers killing the president, William Richard
Tolbert, Jr., along with 24 members of his security staff and of his government. Although
extremely violent, Samuel Doe’s coup gained consequent popularity among the Liberians
when he expressed his will to defend the long-oppressed population. However, his
political control soon involved oppressions to americo-liberians and to indigenous people
that would not be part of his ethnicity (Krahn).63 After several years in power the Doe’s
government was starting to crumble when an army rebellion called the National Patriotic
Front of Liberia led by Charles Taylor attacked from Côte d’Ivoire. In six months this
rebel group recruited ten thousand armed men and was therefore able to capture a
consequent part of the Liberian territory including important locations such as Buchanan,
the second largest city in the country. This military progress forced the Economic
Community of West Africa to offer a peace deal. In 1990, Doe’s government unwillingly
accepted an ECOWAS proposal that included a ceasefire, the deployment of a
peacekeeping force called ECOMOG and the formation of a new government of national
unity.64
Soon after and although under the supervision of ECOMOG, Doe was murdered
by Prince Yormie Johnson’s armed men after they were invited to discuss a peace
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arrangement. Prince Yormie Johnson was a collaborator of the NPFL, however contrary
to Doe’s contingent, which was forced by ECOMOG to disarm, the INPFL kept their
arsenal and was able to capture, torture and then killed the president and his group.
As it is clearly explained by Farrall in his article Recurring dilemmas in a
recurring conflict: Evaluating UN mission in Liberia (2003-2006), the following 13 years
were illustrated by moments of peace and return to conflict. 65 Charles Taylor became a
leader and was able to gain military control over a vast majority of the Liberian territory.
In July 1997, he finally legitimized his power thanks to political elections promoted by
the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). Meanwhile, the country fell
into a new cycle of conflicts opposing the Taylor’s government to two armed groups, the
Liberians United for Reconciliations (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in
Liberia (MODEL). Over the next six years, Taylor’s power was confined to the city of
Monrovia.
In 2003, Taylor left office after the rebel groups gained most of the Liberian
territory and put Monrovia under siege. President Bush offered to support the deployment
of a Peace Operation under the condition that Taylor would leave his office. However,
ECOWAS got in-between and made a deal with Taylor in which their armed force would
be immediately deployed and Taylor would be exiled to Nigeria. Then, after three months
ECOMIL would be replaced by a UN peace operation. In August 2003, the three major
parties to the conflict, the Liberian government, LURD and MODEL met in Ghana to
sign the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement that included a transitional period of two and
a half year, which would enable the establishment of a shared transitional government.
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The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established under chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter to monitor the Peace process, and was also mandated to
facilitate the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation of the armed forces
as well as help this transitional government in the reform of the security sector.66
Since then UNMIL mandate has comprehended: “enabling the transition of full security
responsibility to the Liberia National Police by strengthening its capabilities, promoting
human rights, supporting national process of reconciliation, constitutional reform, and
decentralization, enhancing support for security sector and rule of law reform, supporting
the participation of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding,
enhancing cooperation with ONUCI for the stabilization of border area and coordinating
and collaborating with the Peacebuilding Commission on its engagement in Liberia,
ensuring regular interaction with the civilian population to raise awareness and
understanding about its mandate and activities.67

Since June 2014 the development process of Liberia has been put on hold, as the
attempt to control the spread of the Ebola Virus Disease epidemic has become the
priority. Indeed, in the UNMIL progress report to the Security Council under the United
States Presidency, Karin Langdren, Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
expressed her concerns by qualifying the crisis as “the greatest threat since the war”68 and
therefore explained that the majority of her report would focus on the matter.
Furthermore, according to the Liberian Ministry of Health, there is over 2070 reported
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cases and more than 1200 deaths as of August 2014. The SRSG of Liberia also attempted
to enlighten the Security Council members on the different ways in which the crisis has
spread. Firstly, she mentioned the exponential growth of this crisis, and explained that
cultural rituals of death, given the epidemic, became extremely dangerous and only the
full commitment of both religious and traditional leaders would enable UNMIL and the
Liberian government to replace these traditions by safer ones, thus avoiding a
consequential increase in the reported cases. She continued her report by mentioning the
lack of confidence coming from an important part of the population, which rejects the
importance of Ebola or to an extreme point even rejects its whole existence. Then she
devoted an important part of her review on the infrastructural problems that emerged due
to the epidemic crisis and forced the public system to undertake extreme measures such
as the closings of schools and markets and most importantly the closing of borders apart
from a few exceptions. In a public allocution, she listed other issues that were developed
due to the crisis: the increase of prices, the expected cut by more than half of the
economic growth, the deceleration of trades, the fact that many farmers had to stop
tending their field, even though agriculture is a pilar of the Liberian economic and social
system and lastly children are currently prevented from going to school, among other
important issues. 69 Moreover, she reported the decision of the National Elections
Commission to postpone the mid-term senatorial elections, initially taking place on
October 14th, 2014. She then reinforces the importance of giving clarity to the Liberians
in this time of uncertainty.
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The other part of this chapter will focus on the different Quick Impact Projects
that has been implemented in the past and those recently chosen to support the Liberian
government in dealing with this epidemic crisis.
UNMIL Quick Impact Project Initiatives:
Liberia has been profoundly affected by the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD).
Although the epidemic seems to be receding, The World Bank published in January 2015
a final report on the matter in order to raise awareness of the impact of the Ebola
outbreak on the social and economic life of the Liberians. The result are worrying as it
confirmed that "even with improvements in the health situation, the economy continues
to shed jobs faster than they are replaced." 70 It is even more perturbing as the Ebola
stigma could become a threat to the stability that Liberia has been able to achieve so far.
Indeed, negative socio-economic impacts such as an increase in the unemployment rate,
or the spiking prices of basic necessities such as rice or local produce, due to the impact
that the epidemic had on agricultural work, can lead to food insecurity and to potential
conflict. As the chart in the World Bank report illustrates71, the increasing prices of rice
can be explained due to the closing of public places such as markets or the difficult
accessibility of fresh produce and rice to urban areas, among other issues. However, the
report seems to give more concern to the lack of consumer resources as a threat to food
security, as many work places had to shut down. A large part of the Liberian population
lost a consequential part of their general income, obviously impacted their capacity to
sustain themselves. Indeed, as the World Bank report noticed, " many in wage labor are
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not working because their business or government office is closed, and very few have
been able to return or find alternative employment."72
The tough socio-economic impacts can have tremendous repercussions on the
stability of a country especially if the latter is still very fragile. In the case of Liberia,
QIPs are very important for different reasons: First of all, attempting to fill the basic
needs in communities that erupted with the crisis, secondly, to assure that the population
stays confident about the mandate and the mission, especially during the crisis and lastly,
to support the national government in handling the situation.
Similarly to the other case-studies, this chapter attempts to analyze the work of
the UNMIL QIPs team on Rule of Law issues and witness the achievements and
shortcomings of the mission in responding to the mandate stated in Resolution 2066 of
the Security Council.
The mandate and QIPs
The resolution 2066 states that the rule of law, which is part of the peace-building
process, is one of the "key areas"73 to which the Mission should give priority. The QIPs
thus become a very important tool for the Mission to assist the government in "the reform
and restructuring of the Justice Sector."74 The Security Council also asks the Liberian
government to coordinate and collaborate with UNMIL in order to reinforce its public
institutions. Therefore QIPs are used in order to create a genuine bond between partners,
facilitate the relationships and build cooperation. In order to accurately gather
information on QIPs in Liberia, a questionnaire was sent to the QIPs Team in UNMIL.
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The participants have background in the corrections field. They are civilian staffs from
many different country75, with a professional experience in their national prison of at
least 15 years. As the interviewees explained in the case of Rule of Law, they would
assist the government in "supply of EVD items in order to avoid the spread of Ebola in
the facilities." 76 The interviewees have to assist corrections facilities through QIPs
initiatives, because prison officers can transmit the disease inside and outside the
infrastructure, therefore aggravating the case of Ebola. Moreover, these confined
establishments with often no proper health system, have higher chances to witness a rapid
spread of the disease without having durable solutions. The contamination of detainees
would require the corrections facilities to find ways to transport the sick to hospitals and
assure their well-being while guaranteeing security. QIPs thus become not a solution but
a mean for prevention.
The Security Council is clear when stating that the State of Liberia is responsible
for the reform of its public institutions, especially in the rule of law area. However, it also
mentions the duty of UNMIL to properly assist the government in reaching complete
autonomy. QIPs was recently used as a preventive tool for the spread of Ebola, however
it has always been considered as a general tool to assist the government in reconnecting
with its population through the development or reinforcement of public institutions,
particularly regarding the Justice and Corrections system. The interviewees explained in
their responses that QIPs, which were initially planned to only be used for two or three
years, has been used on a longer period because it became a solution to "the limited
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resources of the national partners."77 QIPs therefore become a budget option to achieve
part of the mandate, reforming the justice and corrections system for instance, and
therefore strengthening the whole Rule of Law system in Liberia. The UNMIL mandate
changed from being purely peace-keeping to becoming a peace-building mission,
attempting to restructure norms and institutions that are vital for the long-term stability of
a country like Liberia, which has suffered decades of civil war and human rights
violations. The UNMIL mandate, as previously mentioned is thus focusing on the
Security Sector Reform, rule of law and human rights. As any institutional reform, the
process of change is tremendously long and sinuous. QIPs are therefore used to provide
fast-paced improvements that could assist the government in bringing rapid changes to
the population. Indeed, QIPs policy describes their use as to assist in developing a good
relationship between the Mission and the national partners, however, it is also accurate to
notice that it may also consequently improve relations between the government and its
population, therefore strenghtheing stability. UNMIL is here to provide assistance and
guidance, however the government is often the main stakeholder in the endeavor when it
comes to reforming the rule of law. The interviewees described the mandate as follows:


Providing strategic and technical advice on corrections issues



Provide support, expertise and guidance on penal reforms



Support the infrastructural development and expansion of the Bureau's
facilities
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Train the Corrections staff in modern prison management and human
rights



(more recently) Support the national partners to prevent the spread of
Ebola in the facilities

The mandate illustrates the importance of training and supporting the government staff on
their renovation of public institutions, including the importance of establishing practices
that respects human rights norms as promoted by the international community.
The actors involved
One of the interesting aspect in analyzing different UN Missions and the
implementation of their QIPs is to notice the plurality of actors involved. Of course, the
national government and the population of the host country as partners for QIPs provide
an indirect tool for the nation as much as they are tools for the Mission. In the case of
Liberia, along with the regular partners such as UNDP, UNICEF, UN Women, UNHCR
or international organizations such as WHO or ICRC and local NGOs, there are also
partnerships that are singular to Liberia. As it is stated in the Resolution 2066, the
Mission was asked to work closely with the Peace-building Commission which became a
QIPs partner to help develop strong and sustainable infrastructures. Other partners
include, the Food and Agricultural organization and others such as German Agro, Prison
Fellowship, Carter Centre, the Justice for Peace Commission and the American Bar
Association which provide assistance for the reform of the Justice and Corrections
systems. Others include the organization of Health, Agriculture, and Development for
Sustainability (HANDS), and lastly the Defense for Children.
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The work within such a plurality of actors could become very sensitive, raising
conflicts and problems of overlapping practices. However, the UNMIL interviewee
seems to be confident in the creation of good relations between all partners. As an
example, he gives the construction of two facilities in Fishtown and Cestos which was
done jointly with the Joint Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV) group and was a
success. He further explains that in order to avoid overlapping work, "close
coordination"78 is a priority when implementing QIPs, which on the down side could lead
to major delays for all the parties to agree on a project.
The other interesting point when it comes to analyzing partners is the issue of
eligibility. The interviewees stated that this is a concerning point regarding QIPs because
neither the Guidelines nor the Policy are strictly specific regarding the selection of
implementing partners. It is informally agreed that any type of actors could participate in
these projects. However, it could also become an issue of time, if the UNMIL QIPs team
has to research and monitor each potential partner to make certain that any affiliation to
political, religious, social parties would not turn into the instrumentalization of a project
and therefore favor a community to the detriment of another. In order to do so, the
interviewees further explained, the UNMIL team has to analyze "the political (or
religious) profile of a given implementing partner, the capacity and reliability of the
implementing partner and their relationship to the identified project site host
community."79
Another problem raised concerning the plurality of partners is the difference in
the expectations of the outcome. Indeed, because each partner has a different mandate,
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they might expect a different result in order to consider the project effective. The
singularity of the mandate leads to a singularity of achievements and therefore might
create disappointment or confusion. It was also mentioned that the government expressed
concerns regarding the short-term nature of the projects. The public authority may
misinterpret these projects and consider them as potential long-term initiatives to respond
to a long-term goal, when they are, as defined by the interviewee, "seed money projects."
Categories of QIPs
QIPs categories are usually similar among the different missions. Three kinds of
categories in UNMIL can be defined: 1/ the promotion of acceptance of the mandated
tasks and support of credibility of the work achieved by the mission; 2/ contribution to
building confidence in the peace process and strengthening support in this process
through “demonstrating early dividends of stability to the population”80; 3/ contribution
to improving the environment for the mandate implementation including “through
addressing immediate needs of the population.” 81 These general categories are then
supported by practical categories which in the case of Corrections QIPs are as follows:
prison infrastructural improvements, training of corrections staff, support of prisoners’
rehabilitation programmes, spiritual and social welfare services, and in the recent months
the supply of EVD items to prevent the spread of Ebola in the prison facilities. These
categories of QIPs are supporting the long-term work of the mission by assisting the
government in getting institutions that will not only protect civilians but also the basic
rights of its population while improving the security of the communities. By improving
the well-being of the incarcerated population and developing infrastructure and a
80
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Corrections system that would respect the International Minimum Standard Rules, 82
security would be improved on two levels: the renovation of prisons obviously assures
the physical security of detainees and prison staff, but it could also have a positive impact
on detainees’ behavior. For instance, the rehabilitation program is tremendously
important to train the detainees professionally and to a larger extent avoid a recurrence of
criminality.
The Corrections QIPs represents 12% of the total QIPs and has been focusing
mostly on renovation and construction work and on training of staff (60 projects in total)
all done in coordination with the Bureau of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
The implementation cycle
The QIPs are all undertaken in consultation with representatives of national and
local authorities, and where appropriate, with the participation of local communities. The
Head of Field Office is a major pillar of the implementation cycle in Liberia as it is the
one which interprets the mandate in correlation with defining geographic and thematic
priority in the selection of QIPs. Indeed, the Field Office is significant in the QIPs choice
because their constant presence on the field make them more aware of the needs of the
communities and therefore more relevant in carefully choosing QIPs theme to fit both the
local needs and the mandate requirements. The other pillar is obviously the constant
cooperation with external actors. Then, it is the role of the Head of Mission to establish a
Project Review Committee. Once projects are accepted, the responsibility of monitoring
the implementation is given to the appropriate component representative, and work with
the finance department is set up. With regards to finance, the Director of Mission Support
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is in charge of setting out the conditions for financial management and ensuring that the
allocation of funds is in accordance with the UN financial rules and regulations. For
instance, these rules ask for the QIPs team to use wire transfer as a way of payment and
prohibit the use of cash. The latter being very unsafe because it quickly becomes
untraceable and prevent the whole monitoring process from being truly effective.
Interviewees from different missions raised the problem of having implementing partners
disappearing with the money before wiring transfer were introduced. Although, other
comments were made on the difficult process that a wire transfer requires in a country
witnessing a state of institutionalization and reconstruction.
Use and purpose
There is a two-level confidence building system in the implementation of QIPs.
First, it helps the UNMIL Mission to develop legitimacy in its support of the government
and thus creates good relationships between the public authority and the civilian staff. On
the other hand, it also helps the work of the peacekeepers to be considered by the
population not as an occupation force but rather as a positive assisting dynamism.
Therefore, instead of having some antagonist energy between the mission and the
national actors, a strong link of cooperation is developed facilitating the work of the
Mission while consequently improving the well-being of the population. Another fact
worth noting is the subliminal creation of a mutual trust between the host government and
its population. Indeed, with the constant participation of public offices in the QIPs, the
population may develop a better understanding of their expectations as citizens toward
their State. It is of major importance for stability to be sustainable that the population
starts acknowledging their role and rights in their society. The involvement of civil
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society in these projects further enhances the importance of representation and civil
action in a democratic space. Indeed, QIPs can also work on a political basis, as being a
tool to respond to the population needs, and most importantly, become a tool for the
community to express these needs. The use and purpose of QIPs is important in a state of
volatile stability as it develops relations between actors that were not accustomed to
participate in such social dynamics. It is obvious that the primary goal of QIPs is to build
confidence between the Mission and external actors, however, it also informally becomes
an educative tool for the community and the government to participate in the stabilization
process. Peace-building is such a sinuous endeavor that QIPs provides quick results and
strengthen the credibility of all actors within the peace process. This is only when actors
can observe results that the legitimacy of the Mission can be reinforced. Consequently,
this is only when the work of the Mission is accepted that it becomes truly effective.
Achieving mandated tasks is one part of the whole peace projects, as if there is no
recognition of such advancements, the population and its government will never be able
to stabilize peace when the Mission will leave the country.
It is particularly relevant to state that the use of QIPs in post-conflict context, is
subject to perpetual uncertainty. The theory in which QIPs are required to build
confidence and facilitate the work of the mission is stated both in the Guidelines and in
the policy. But this theory does not take into consideration all the difficulties listed by the
UNMIL team such as “the high volatility of political stability, the occurrence of
corruption, the unreliability of public infrastructure, the difficulty to deal with weather
conditions, price fluctuations and public strife.”83 The latter are part of a common disease
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that many post-conflict countries experience. The unstable political realm, the political
bigotry often give possibilities of fraud and political misconduct. These troubles can lead
to drastic outcome such as the collapse of all the achievements and the fall back into
conflict. All these problems need to be assessed and avoided by the UNMIL QIPs team in
order to circumvent any issue and loss of legitimacy.
The interviewees also listed several recurrent complications that are often
delaying the operational practice of QIPs in Liberia and lessen consequently the positive
impact that QIPs may have on the overall effectiveness of the mission. There are constant
logistics problems, such as a complicated or even impossible access to project sites, the
lack of business acumen among the local contractors or the fluctuation of prices…84
Although important difficulties may delay the implementation cycle of QIPs,
UNMIL has delegated the work of conducting an assessment review to the Joint Mission
Analysis Centre in 2014 and the result were positive and shown that the QIPs have been
“highly successful

in

restoring authority and capacity-building

within local

communities.”85 However, the interviewees stated that UNMIL needed to refocus QIPs’
priorities toward livelihood generation programmes and socio-economic access to basic
services in order to generate decentralization and the strengthening of local ownership of
QIPs to assure the longevity of improving conditions created by the projects.
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Chapter VII: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH)
MINUSTAH Background
In 1990 the provisional government of Haiti sought the assistance of the United
Nations, which became the first mission to Haiti to strengthen the free and fair
proceedings of the national election. The resolution of March 1990 established the United
Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH).This
mission was jointly supervised by the Member States and the Organization of American
States to achieve the peaceful occurrence of the national elections in Haiti and more
broadly assist in the support of the economic and social development efforts of the
country. Such an endeavor necessitated the gathering of the first fifty-observer group that
assisted in the implementation of democratic elections; more observers arrived during the
time of registration and elections in order to assure a peaceful and fair proceeding. Lastly,
two or three advisers were requested to bring assistance to the coordinating committee for
the security of the elections.
ONUVEH reported that the election occurred without major incidents and
therefore the Haitian population had, for the first time, participated in a democratic
election where Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president. In 1991, a military coup led
by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras evicted the newly elected government and the
political and social situation dramatically worsened. On October 2nd, Secretary-General
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar stated that the international community was hoping to see the
return to power of the rightful government in accordance to the Haitian constitution. The
OAS ministers of foreign affairs also demanded the return of President Aristide and thus
echoed the statement of Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar although in a tougher voice.
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Indeed, they asked for a complete isolation of Haiti until the legitimate government was
reinstated. Soon after their demand, they sent a delegation to Haiti but the Army soon
expelled it from the territory. A few days later, the two Haitian Chambers were forced by
the military to appoint a new president, a prime minister. The OAS reacted to the illegal
appointment of the new heads of administration by adopted a new resolution to condemn
the creation of any illegitimate government that could result from this undemocratic
coup. Two days after the statement made by the foreign ministers of the OAS, the United
Nations matched their declaration and asked all member states to assist the OAS in
achieving their mandates.
In February 1993, the Secretary-General decided to dispatch a preliminary team
in order to prepare the arrival of the UN component of the Mission to Haiti. The UN and
the OAS jointly managed the mission and therefore a Head of Mission appointed by both
parties directed the mission’s operations. By the end of May, the operation team
comprised of more than a hundred personnel. In June, following the submission of a
human rights report that listed multiple violations, along with the statement from the
Permanent representative of Haiti in New York that explained that the constitutional
order was not yet restored and thus requested the international community to put a
mandatory embargo on oil and arms. The Security Council answered the request on June
16th and the members adopted a resolution86 that obligated States to prevent the sale or
supply of any kind of defensive or offensive weapons from their territory or their
nationals. The Security Council members also forbid the sale of oil 87 and lastly, they

86

Security Council, Resolution 841 on the situation in Haiti, June 16th 1993
87
In the exception of humanitarian use. See Resolution 841 above mentioned.
61

decided to freeze all funds in the name of the government of Haiti, hoping to encourage
Army General Raoul Cédras, to join negotiations with President Aristide.
In the end of June, Army General Raoul Cédras accepted the Special Envoy’s
invitation to meet with Jean-Bertrand Aristide. They met on July 3rd in New York and
were able to reach an agreement in which the mission’s presence was maintained in order
to modernize the Armed Force and to assist in establishing a new Police force. Following
the meeting, the Security Council suspended the sanctions and on July 16, 1993, the
parties agreed to a six-month truce. Although an agreement had been signed, the political
situation soon deteriorated. In September 1993, reports stated that human rights
violations and deep mistrust between political parties occurred on a daily basis. This
political turmoil hurried the creation and deployment of UNMIH, the first UN
peacekeeping operation to Haiti.

Despite the deployment of UNMIH, the political

circumstances only worsened. The military broke the agreement by not reinstated
President Aristide and prevented also the UNMIH team from deploying. Therefore, in
December 1993 the UNMIH mandate was extended in order to improve the lack of
progress concerning the agreements signed in New York City. The Security Council had
long terminated the suspension of sanctions however the provisional president, in July
1994, announced that MICIVIH was no longer desirable. On July 31st, 1994 and after
months of diplomatic failures, the Security Council passed resolution 940 under chapter
VII and authorized a multinational forces to use "all necessary means" to ease the
military departure on one hand and the return of the legitimate president and his
government on the other hand. In September 1994, the multinational force was deployed
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and achieved a peaceful implementation of the terms of resolution 940. In March 1995,
UNMIH took over the peace operations in Haiti.
UNMIH was replaced by the United Nations Mission Support in Haiti
(UNSMIH) and Haiti witnessed their first hand-over of power between two
democratically elected presidents. Thus, it announced the need for a new type of
assistance, which was established through resolution 1063, on June 28, 1996. It had,
among other mandated tasks, to assist the government of Haiti in creating, maintaining
and strengthening a stable environment through the reinforcement and professionalization
of the Haitian National Police (HNP) 88. The government of Haiti had been extremely
determined to develop and strengthen their rule of law institutions in accordance to
human rights norms. Although the progress was consequential the HNP was still lacking
the experience and confidence to control on subversive groups endangering the peace and
democratic process in Haiti, therefore the mandate was extended until May 1997. In July,
the recently appointed Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed that despite the progress
made the challenges were still important. It necessitates the establishment of a new
mission capable of managing the progress that has been made while effectively handling
the transitional challenges.
On April 30, 2004, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH) was established through resolution 1542. Although the mandate was quite
similar to the previous missions, the difference was in the size of the civilian force
dispatched in the country. Indeed, UNMIH was only composed of 160 international
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civilian staff, 89 UNSMIH 119 civilian personnel 90 , and MINUSTAH had 550 civilian
officers. 91 This large number of civilian affair staff was required in order to further
strengthen the National Police, restore and maintain the rule of law institutions, support
the constitutional and political process, the human rights monitoring and last but not least
assist the Haitian government in their Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
program 92 . Not only peace and security had to be secured and stabilized, but the
reinforcement of public authority was to be prioritized through the processes of peacebuilding and capacity building.
The earthquake in 2010 tremendously weakened Haiti. With 220,000 people
dead and more than 1.5 million left homeless, the natural catastrophe had a profound
impact on the political and social climate throughout the country. The United Nations
therefore authorized the temporary increase in personnel to counter the calamitous
situation.
In November 2010, another wave of political turmoil occurred after accusations
of fraud were made following the release of the primary results regarding the presidential
elections, which consequently led to another outbreak of violence. The Security Council
then made a statement calling for peaceful and democratic elections. In February 2011,
the final results of the first round of presidential and legislative elections were released,
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two months later the results showed that Michel Martelly was democratically elected
president of Haiti.
In both 2011 and 2012 through resolutions 2012 and 2070 respectively, UN
personnel were decreased in MINUSTAH after the release of the Secretary-General’s
report93 in which he stated that a decrease in the police and military force would not be a
threat to the security in Haiti. In the latter resolution, the Security Council acknowledged
"that the overall security situation while fragile has improved since the adoption of its
resolutions 1908, 1927 and 1944, and remained relatively stable since the adoption of its
resolution 2012 (2011)."94
The situation in Haiti is in a process where the strengthening of public
institutions has been understood as a fundamental step in the construction of a stabilized
social and political system. Indeed, as in the two previous study-cases (UNMIL and
MONUSCO), it can be seen that peacekeeping is strongly intertwined in the concept of
rule of law and capacity-building. The next step in our analysis is to understand how
Quick Impact Projects work in such dynamics, and whether or not it helps the United
Nations Missions in assisting the state to reinforce its public authority while respecting
the fundamental rights and well-being of its population.
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MINUSTAH Quick Impact Projects intiatives
This part of the MINUSTAH chapter examines how QIPs are being used and
implemented. In order to be able to develop a framework of evaluation that would enable
an adequate assessment for the impact of QIPs on the effectiveness of a mission, it is
important to first understand if there is a generality in their use among missions.
Therefore, interviews were conducted with each person in charge of QIPs. In the case of
MINUSTAH, the mission mandated through resolution 1542 on April 30th 2004, an
interview was conducted via email, and has been analyzed in parallel to the report they
produced in 2011. The focal point who accepted to participate in the interview is a lawyer
and journalist and has worked for MINUSTAH since June 2006. His responsibilities are
directed towards the strengthening of the rule of law in Haiti, more precisely in the
Justice department. Surely, deeper research would enable a greater spectrum of
interviewees and further the accuracy of the research, however for the time being, as
previously mentioned, this analysis will focus on the peace-building and rule of law
initiatives of the mission, without ignoring the profound impact it could have on the
security level.
This part will be divided into sub-parts in order to understand the implementation
cycle, the role of the different stakeholders, the use and nature of QIPs and of course, the
shortcomings and achievements that have been observed since the first QIPs were
created.
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The mandate and QIPs
The Quick Impact projects in MINUSTAH officially started in 2004, a year after
the Brahimi report recommended a better focus on the consolidation of a climate of trust
between the population and the mission. As the interviewee stated, "the objective of
MINUSTAH was firstly to reestablish peace and public stability in Haiti in order to
facilitate a political transition through the hosting of fair and free elections. Through the
mandate, the other important goal aimed at toward the reinforcement of the National
Police Force, in order to assure the security of the population after the Mission's
departure." 95 But, in 2007, resolution 1702 extended the mandate to include the
strengthening of rule of law in the Justice area. The mission was therefore asked to:
assist with the restructuring and maintenance of the rule of law, public
safety and public order, will provide assistance and advice to the Haitian
authorities,

in

consultation

with

relevant

actors,

in

monitoring,

restructuring, reforming and strengthening of the justice sector, including
through technical assistance to review all relevant legislation, the provision
of experts to serve as professional resources, the rapid identification and
implementation of mechanisms to address prison overcrowding and
prolonged pre-trial detention and the coordination and planning of these
activities, and invites the Government of Haiti to take full advantage of that
assistance.96
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In 2007 it specifically required the mission "to maintain a proactive
communications and public outreach strategy to improve public understanding of the
mandate and the role of MINUSTAH in Haiti."97
The mandate related to justice included a very detailed plan on how to assist the
Haitian judicial system. Indeed, the mission had to reinforce the technical capacities of
the judiciary, transfer know-how to the relevant actors in preparation of the mission's
departure, and implement QIPs in order to maximize the climate of trust in association
with the justice sector and the Superior Council of the Judicial Power. This part included
the implementation of construction projects as stated in resolution 1927, in order to
reconstruct some of the courts and tribunals that had been destroyed during the 2010
earthquake. The mandate required the mission to support the justice commission to
decrease the number of prolonged detentions, to organize research, and to publish the
results. It also required the mission to assist the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in
reintroducing the forensic institute, to assist the government in establishing the Superior
Council of the Judiciary Power and to give judicial advice to other sectors of
MINUSTAH. The role of QIPs is therefore to assist in these processes in order, on one
hand, to strengthen the good relations between the actors of the host country and the
mission, and on the other hand to reinforce the mission's legitimacy to assist the
government. 98
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The actors involved in the Justice MINUSTAH QIPs program
Quick Impact Projects include a large number of actors from different sectors. As
the interviewee explained, the mission mostly deals with services of the government, and
donors that he listed as follows:


Ministry of Justice and Public Security



Superior Council of the Judiciary



Forensic Institute



Ministry of Public Health and Population



Appeal Court of Port-au-Prince



Court of Cassation



United Nations Development Programme



Donors such as International Organization of Francophonie, USAID...
The interview participant did not mention the role of grassroots NGOs. However,

the mission’s 2012 Report reveals that NGOs and grassroots associations often propose
projects that would help the community.99 Each stakeholder has a different role to play,
either to propose, create or implement the projects in order to effectively complete the
QIPs cycle, which will be further explained in the analysis. It appears that most
stakeholders for the justice program of QIPs are from the public service. It might not be
the case in all kind of QIPs, however, in the case of Justice, the mandate of MINUSTAH
requires the development of a strong and fair judicial system and its development
throughout the country. Its primary purpose is to reinforce on a longer term the rule of
law institutions and the capacity of public infrastructures. The partnership between
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MINUSTAH and the government with regards to QIPs seems therefore part of a larger
project than simply improving the confidence between the Mission and the host
population.

The different categories of QIPs
Between 2004-2005, the year of the introduction of QIPs in Haiti, and 2011, the
date of their most recent report, more than a thousand projects have been implemented by
the MINUSTAH Quick Impact Project team and their partners. There are four categories
that describe the different type of projects. Based on the chart below. 100
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This chart shows the different categories and the quantity of projects that have
been done each year. As we can see the number of projects, depending on the type, varies
according to the year. In 2010-2011, given the assistance needed to reconstruct
infrastructure after the hurricane, projects in the category infrastructure and public
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services tremendously increased to answer the demand. Indeed, in order to build
confidence between the mission and the host country MINUSTAH has had to answer the
primary needs depending on the situation. QIPs have to be extremely practical and
achieve important visibility in order to maximize the climate of trust. Because of its
short-term nature, they had to answer primary needs coming from either the population or
the local authorities in order to avoid turning the project outcomes into something
elusive. Over the years, this would impact on the mission’s ability to work effectively.
Therefore, as the chart shows, infrastructure remains the dominant category even though
there are variations for the "training/ capacity building" and the "livelihood/employment
generation" which have both consequently increased over the years. The "social services"
projects stopped being a full category by 2009 and merged with the "infrastructure/public
services" category102.
The category "Infrastructure/public services" encompasses different subcategories
of work such as construction and renovation, usually of public ownership, such as courts
and tribunals, city halls, police stations and schools but also road repairs, shore protection
and electrification projects. The social services used to include water distribution
projects, sewage and canal cleaning but as previously mentioned it is now part of the
former category. Another important category is the training and building capacity
projects, whose primary purpose is to prepare and reinforce the state personnel capacity
on issues such as human rights, gender or simply to assure the effectiveness of the public
institutions. The report explains the work of the mission "as a response to the need to
build capacity within the public service system following the 2006 local and general
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elections and to enhance the decentralization process."103 The last part of this statement is
interesting for this research. It reveals that not only do QIPs build a climate of trust, but
in the case of MINUSTAH they also assists the state in building its own public
infrastructure and therefore its own public legitimacy. This is in addition to making sure
that they not only respect but strongly implement the international standards of
democracy and human rights. The different stakeholders have therefore the duty to
determine practically what is meant in the QIPs policy as a "contribution to promoting
acceptance of the mandated tasks," "building confidence in the peace process" or
"generating support for the mission."104

The implementation cycle
According to the guidelines, QIPs projects "should" follow a very strict cycle
from creation to evaluation. Generally, it starts with the Identification and Review. This
usually begins when an entity either public, private or directly within the mission
proposes a project. According to the MINUSTAH QIPs representative "for all QIPs, you
always need a demand from the national partner, which could be from a ministry, local
authorities, a local judiciary authority or a grassroots NGO. This proposal is formulated
directly in the region where the project may be implemented and the entity submitting it
has the duty to inform the ministry in charge of the issue for which the QIP is being
created. For instance, in the case of justice QIPs, the entity would have the responsibility
to inform the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety in order to make sure that the project
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would be sustainable.105 Once a project is initiated, it is sent to the MINUSTAH section
that is in charge of leading it.106 This section will then work with the Department of Civil
Affairs in order to deal with the QIP budget. Each department is entitled to their own part
of the annual budget.107
The next step in the cycle is the intervention of the Project Review Committee
composed of representatives of every MINUSTAH section 108 . This committee is the
decisional branch of the process and is in charge of deciding whether or not a project
proposal is feasible and can be approved.
Based on the guidelines, each head of mission should establish a QIPs
Management Team (QMT), however, in his interview, the MINUSTAH representative
did not mention the QMT as a leading team for the creation or implementation of the
project. The project, once accepted by the Review Committee is validated by the head of
the Civil Affairs Team.
Then, the Central office of Civil Affairs in Port-au-Prince sends the project
proposal to the Finance Team, which finally reach the Division of Mission Support for
the final part of the agreement process. The budget service sends the project to the
Finance Team in order to release the funds, which is often 80% of the total amount.
However, the funds are usually divided in two or three parts depending on the situation.
As the guidelines advises, the missions should consider a 40/40/20 disbursement when
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they deal with new implementing partners. Indeed, as another interviewee from the Civil
Affairs Office at the UN headquarters in New York explained, it has happened that
implementing partners would disappear with the money, obviously putting the whole
mission and QIPs team in a complicated situation.109
Once the first payment is made, the implementing partner starts the project. The
way in which the project progresses is monitored depending on the requirements of the
Mission. Nothing is clearly detailed at this level in the guidelines. For example, in the
case of MINUSTAH, the mission asks the implementing partner and the entity who
submits the idea to provide a financial statement with documents to substantiate the
report. The goal is to explain with specific details the progress of the project and prove
that the latter is either finished or soon to be finished. Once this report is submitted, the
budget section analyzes it and if it considers that enough work has been achieved, asks
the financial section to transfer the 20% remaining in the budget. The interviewee also
explained that throughout the entire process of implementation, both justice and civil
affairs officers from the regional office organize visits to monitor the progress of the
project.
The last part of the cycle, according to the guidelines, is the closure, evaluation of
the project and the writing of the final report. Indeed, the missions are asked to develop
annual reports on QIPs in order to assess their work throughout the year and inform the
headquarters in NYC on any shortcomings and difficulties they had to overcome. In the
case of MINUSTAH, an annual report has been developed in 2012 and gathers all their
work since QIPs started in 2004-2005. The report summarizes the implementation
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process and attempts to evaluate the impact that MINUSTAH QIPs had achieved. It is,
apparently, the only substantive report that has been submitted by a mission since the
implementation of the QIPs policy in the UN peacekeeping field.
The use and purpose of QIPs
The first QIPs Policy that was published by the UN headquarters defined the
scope and purpose of QIPs as follows: promoting acceptance of the mandated tasks,
building confidence in the peace process and generating support for the mission.110 These
directives are quite general as it does not precisely inform the Mission on how QIPs
would generate support and confidence. It simply advises the UN personnel in the field
that their projects should follow these purposes but leaving them with the possibility of
taking initiatives according to the situation they are currently dealing with. Obviously, the
headquarters understood that figuring which type of projects would generate support is a
task that only the people in the field can achieve, for it is a case-by-case process, not even
nationally, but also regionally. Consequently, depending on the location of the QIPs, its
nature will be different in order to respond to a specific need. As the interviewee
explained in the case of MINUSTAH: "the goals and purposes of QIPs depends on the
nature of the project."111 For instance, the construction or rehabilitation projects proposed
by the government (through the request of a ministry) is usually aimed at improving the
work conditions. As it was stated for the justice QIPs, "to provide a more appropriate
framework to facilitate the effectiveness of the judiciary, to strengthen the prestige of the
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Judiciary, and to smooth the fair and equitable distribution of Justice in a reasonable
timeframe."112
When it comes to QIPs training, their goal was to "build capacity within the
public service system following the 2006 local and general elections and to enhance the
decentralization process."113 Therefore, the purpose of QIPs is no longer about building
confidence but also building capacity and to professionalize the public service personnel.
The interviewee explain that they also aim at improve "the quality of judicial decisions
and the judges' competence.” More broadly, he explains that the goal is to reinforce the
institutional capacity and strengthen the authority of public authorities. Lastly, he
mentions, “the purpose of some QIPs is to improve the living conditions of the
population." 114 Indeed, the policy requires that the projects be "rapidly-implementable
and of benefit to the population."115 The QIPs projects proposals come from ministries,
local authorities or directly from the community, therefore, depending on which entity
initiates it, the purpose might change to respond a need from the demanding stakeholder.
It is also noted that the timeframe will differ, for instance, the use of QIPs for the public
authority, such as the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, seems to be based on a
longer-term goal (strengthening the rule of law), although using small projects. When it
comes directly from a need of the community the project is on a short-term basis, such as
installing solar panels or building a community plaza.
The interviewee at the UNHQ reinforces that statement by saying that the QIPs
primary purpose is to build confidence in the Mission and the peace process “[...] because
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we want those actors to be engaged and supportive of the peace process, so QIPs are one
of the tools to develop this kind of relationship."116 As an example, the MINUSTAH
mission in partnership with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security set up a large
construction process of facilities for tribunals. Thanks to the QIPs project of construction,
the Ministry became owner of more than 70% of the tribunal facilities compared to only
10% in the past.
QIPs are also used to develop strong relationships between the Mission and the
government, local authorities, civil society representatives and the population. Not only
does each project respond to a specific need, it also would be impossible for the different
partners to answer these needs without funds from the Mission. As an example the
MINUSTAH officer explained that the tribunal of Saint Michel de l'Attalaye is the result
of a partnership between MINUSTAH, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, local
authorities and civil society, and the Haitian President described it as a “very beautiful
structure”. However, in some cases, when the UN Mission has not enough funds,
development agencies such as UNDP can participate in the project. These projects are
really directed toward the increase of the well-being of the population.
QIPs in Haiti are also aimed at facilitating dialogue and understanding between
the mission, civil society and the Haitian State. The human rights, justice, electoral
divisions and the component to decrease community violence inside MINUSTAH
focused their QIPs on this process of improving the dialogue and the relations between
society groups, either public or private. These projects enable MINUSTAH to develop
strong relations with most components of the Haitian society and therefore strengthen its
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legitimacy in working for the development of rule of law and peace. As the interviewee
stated, "the execution of QIPs allow a direct contact with the local authorities and with
several civil society grassroots associations and with the population. It appears as the
Mission satisfies a communal claim, therefore facilitating dialogue and comprehension
between stakeholders."117
The QIPs have helped the security organs (Haitian National Police) to strengthen
their authority in a democratic manner, reinforcing de facto the country peace
stabilization process. The corrections team of MINUSTAH also developed many projects
in order to humanize the corrections facilities. The improvement of the living conditions
for inmates can strengthen security by diminishing the risk of escape and enhance the
chances of rehabilitation. QIPs also assisted the corrections facilities in training on
gender and human rights in corrections facilities. Indeed, stabilizing a country is also
ensuring the development of a strong normative system in the public spheres in order to
avoid riots and violence. Security has also been enhanced through the establishment of
QIPs in difficult neighborhoods where the dialogue with the public authority has long
been inexistent. As stated by the interview, the objective was also to show that the
mission is not only focusing on military work but it is also willing to reach security
through development projects.118
QIPs influence the visibility of the mission’s work, which does not only involve
military peacekeeping. Indeed, "even if people can easily forget the catastrophic security
situation of the past, they are witnessing the material achievements that have improved
the living conditions in their community such as construction or school refurbishing,
117
118

Interview in French, Ibid, p.4
op. cit., p5
78

construction of police stations, corrections facilities, drinkable water access in remote and
poor neighborhood of the Haitian territory that has often been forgotten by the public
authorities in the past."119
Thanks to these projects, the reputation of the mission has tremendously
improved. Projects are a reflection of the community's demand and operated with
transparency with the participation of civil society in order to establish, as it is expected,
a climate of harmony and trust between the population and the mission.120 Furthermore,
after the Cholera crisis, an anti-MINUSTAH resentment started to grow. The Parliament
even considered agreeing to the full departure of MINUSTAH. However, the QIPs have
been able to reintroduce the population to the work of the Mission, its positive influence
and in some ways were able to prevent its departure. With good communication and
some projects focusing on the improvement of the living conditions of the population,
MINUSTAH has legitimize its role within the stabilization of Haiti.
QIPs seemed to be a useful tool for the MINUSTAH Mission in order to develop
partnerships and open dialogues with society stakeholders. It also seems to assist in
strengthening the rule of law and education in faraway areas. It helps the Mission to work
with the Haitian State to reinforce its democratic authority and stabilize the country.
A few shortcomings were mentioned during the interviews: Firstly a problem may
emerge if too much attention is given to assist the government in strengthening its
capacity. On the long-term, the population may benefit from it but not necessarily in the
short timeframe that is given to implement QIPs. Therefore the original purpose of QIPs
to build confidence between the mission and the population, in a rapid manner, may be
119
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jeopardized. Secondly, certain projects might overlap with the work of development
agencies and creates tensions in the work environment. In order to avoid such overlaps,
dialogue should be developed between all work partners but at the risk of extending the
process of implementation. Lastly, the implementation cycle is designed with "too many
steps."121 As it was previously explained, the implementation cycle requires phases of
approbations, reports writing, a sinuous bureaucratic process, vacations and lateness of
the implementing partners. All of these delay the finish date of a project to a point where
it can take up to a year and a half when the policy sets the deadline to 6 months.
Moreover, because most of components implementing QIPs do not have a direct budget,
there is a long period of waiting to get the approval of the Project Review Committee, the
Regional Civil Affairs team or the Division Mission Support.
The last part comprehends experiences from the MINUSTAH team manager
which reveal the complications that might erupt during the process of implementing
QIPs. With experiences taken from other missions, this analysis will be able to draw
conclusions on the impact that QIPs might have on a mission's work.
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Chapter VIII. General discussion
Unfortunately, as mentioned before, it was quite difficult to reach people for
interviews due to the distance and because UN staff members are extremely busy. I was
grateful, however, for their participation in adding first-hand information on these QIPs
projects
Besides the difficulty in gathering data, this section of the thesis establishes a
framework for evaluation in order to assess the impact of QIPs on the mission’s
effectiveness. More precisely, I will attempt to develop an assessment plan to understand
whether QIPs really contribute to confidence-building and therefore assist in the
achievement of the mission’s purpose. Indeed, effectiveness will be described as the
capacity to achieve the mandated tasks.
According to the civil affairs officer at the UN headquarters, “QIPs are a tool,
essential in accompanying the mission’s life span and most of its existence.” 122 Its
primary purpose is to build confidence and “to maintain a proactive communications and
public outreach strategy to improve public understanding of the mandate and the role of
MINUSTAH in Haiti”123 as it is required in the resolution 1743 regarding MINUSTAH.
This section first examines the necessary refocusing that all missions should
undertake, followed by the development of observations to assist the missions in
developing a survey that they would use in order to assess the population’s trust
development since the introduction of QIPs.
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Extending the actors and their role
In none of the answers did the interviewees clearly detail the role of the actors.
Many were listed, from government agencies, grassroots NGOs to UN entities, although
the bond created by their work on the projects were never explicitly explained. In
MINUSTAH for instance the main actors seem to be the UN, and the national and local
authorities, although not much were said on NGOs nor did the participant explain who
the implementing partners were. What is striking is also the absence of clarity regarding
the relations between the national and local authorities to the population. It is obvious
that the QIPs are supposed to create a climate of trust between the mission and the
population, but not much is said about the creation of a bond between the mission and
other partners however this would be essential to assess if one’s was willing to estimate
the impact of QIPs on the Mission’s effectiveness. Trying to simply evaluate the impact
of QIPs on the increase of the population’s trust seems to reduce the influence of QIPs to
only one angle of the prism. I do believe that the survey should be detailed in as much
categories as they are relevant partners. It would enable the evaluation to gather the
opinions of all the actors involved.
Another important remark is regarding the lack of comments on the creation of a
bond between the local authorities and the population. Indeed, if QIPs are supposed to
increase the well-being of the population and assist the mission in its tasks, then
supporting the creation of a strong bond between the population and the public authorities
seems to be essential. Stabilization and capacity building can only be properly
implemented if the population starts to trust its political representatives. The mission
should therefore work on this level and QIPs could be an important bridge to connect

82

these two actors. The population would develop its trust; the government would nurture
it. Thinking the process at a micro-level such as with QIPs could be an appropriate start
to further enhance the state building capacity. Indeed, it could also help the mission in
connecting the short-term projects to the long-term mandated tasks. Again, in order to
undertake such process, a survey should be developed to acknowledge the relational
problems that the population might have regarding its political representatives. Many post
conflict country experience corruption, political violence, and a significant problem of
trust. Hence QIPs should be redefining its purpose to include the development of a
climate of trust between all the actors involved in order to notice a tangible change in the
confidence-building process.
The pivotal part in QIPs is the population. Yet, one of the problems that came out
during the interviews is the difficulty to understand what the people need. In order for the
QIPs to have a proper impact this question should be made a priority in order for the
QIPs to be effective and consequently enhance the creation of trust whether between the
community and the mission or as previously mentioned, between the population and its
political representatives. The QIPs need to be centered on the idea of “need of the
population”. Because the timescale of the project only starts when the first payment has
been made to the implementing partner, a time of research and opinion survey should be
exercised in order to grasp what is the definition of these needs. Indeed, the civil affairs
officer mentioned this question during his interview and said: “how do you identify the
need of the population?” 124 This is an extremely relevant question to understand the
impact of QIPs on the mission’s effectiveness. If the population trust is the center of the
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QIPs purpose, and to some extent, the center of the mission’s itself as it is trying to
stabilize a country and build long-lasting peace, the impact cannot be assessed if the need
of the main target is not defined. Thus, the main problem is for the missions to have been
able to assess efficiency but never effectiveness. The leadership of the mission will define
the priorities to which QIPs will have to keep pace with. However, in all the interviews,
nobody mentioned the need of the population or its participation in defining these
priorities that the QIPs will need to be based on.
The survey
The confidence-building system that creates bridges between actors via QIPs
misses the step to define the population needs. Currently, the need of the population
might be a priority in the establishment of QIPs but is not yet considered as a centerpiece
in the QIPs system. It means that the missions lack the capacity to assess QIPs impact on
their effectiveness due to a shortcoming of understanding of what could really be
beneficial to the population. By working with all the actors of the society, public and
private, along with a participation of the different UN agencies, the missions could
achieve synergy to reach not only efficiency, but an effective application of QIPs, which
on a longer term could positively impact the mission.
Below is a chart representing how the cycle of trust should be defined:
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The chart of an effective confidence-building system

Mandated tasks

Assist in their
achievement

Define

answer
s

QIPs

Define the priorities

Confidence
building
system

Population and its
needs
Interactions defining the
needs

Public
authorities

Missions and UN
agencies

NGOs
Civil society

The priorities of the missions are often defined on rational basis. For instance, the
definition in MONUSCO of islands of stabilities was made in order to focus the work in
the violence abatement, as it was defined by Diehl’s and Druckman. However, if the
general goals are important, they are not sufficient to establish trust. Trust is based on a
more emotional connection between the trusted and the trustee. If confidence-building
should be developed, a survey of the community members should be made, in accordance
with local authorities and chiefs, to learn how they define the priorities.
The survey should therefore be done, before and after the implementation of QIPs and
should attempt to gather the opinions of the surveyed people. After gathering the
85

information enabling the establishment of proposals, the political representatives and
chiefs would assist the missions in selecting the more significant one. This step would
create partnerships and trust between the mission and the population but also create a link
between the represented and their authorities. After a selection of proposed projects, the
mission would start the implementation cycle. At the closure of projects, a new survey
should be made to realize the evolution of trust.
Volunteers should do the survey, in order not to lose any part of the QIPs budget.
Local universities, politically engaged people or even foreigners might be willing to
assist the mission in creating a stable bond between all the stakeholders. By doing so, the
volunteers would help the mission in defining what the population wants, and by
precisely answering these needs with the assistance of other actors, they would create a
long-lasting bond, as it is expected; the link of trust would circulate and develop a
positive and stable environment in which the missions could advance long-term projects.
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CONCLUSION
As it was stated in the beginning of this analysis, QIPs are expected to assist the
mission in achieving its mandate by developing strong relations with the population.
However, the bureaucratic system in which the UN personnel is held gives difficulty to
adequately assess its impact. The QIPs efficiency is defined in the all the documents that
the missions use to establish QIPs. However, the United Nations struggles to assess its
effectiveness, that is to say the impact that it has in building a confidence system between
all the stakeholders. The civil officers who was interviewed at the UN headquarters in
New York perfectly summed up this dilemma between efficiency and effectiveness:
“I think the main problem of QIPs is we have not developed a capacity or
an ability to assess their impacts. So I mean the reports I shared with you
basically was trying to look at the efficiency of QIPs. Because I think
member states have been coming back and forth on why QIPs was often
implemented beyond the given timeline, they’re really focusing on process
and so that’s why we attempt to look at who is responsible, what is the
average value of project, … But actually nobody is really asking, how do
we measure whether their contributing to the confidence”125
He states an important dynamic that is recurrent in UN works, what is expected
by the mission from the state members and what the mission should be doing in order to
achieve a high level of effectiveness. Another interviewee from MINUSMA who
previously worked at MINUSTAH approached the same issue when he discussed the
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evaluation made by the auditors, which are usually representing the state members even
though they are working as a board of auditors for the United Nations. He thus explains:
“Because this is also true, and this is an interesting part, when we
receive the auditors from the UN, which are auditors from member
countries, they work as board of auditors for the UN but they are from
the member countries, typically their understanding is the typical of the
financial output, so they don’t have, most of the case, experience from
the field and 90% of the case they just stay at the capital so they don’t
have any idea of how things are in the field and they tend to just apply
the regulations as it is from NYC so this also is a bit discouraging
because if the control that comes from NY are really rigid, I don’t think
any chief of administration is ready to get criticized from on the
outdoors or works and be ready to apply more flexible processes.”126
Both agree that the difficulty to adequately assess the impact of QIPs is because
too much importance is given to their efficiency, to the “process” that the former one
consider “rigid”.
For the missions to be able to satisfactorily assess the impact of QIPs on the
confidence building, which would have a consequent impact on the effectiveness of the
mission, flexibility should be introduced in their implementation process, to encompass
the evaluation of the needs of the population. Including local or foreign volunteers to
establish survey, including researchers and students from the academic world in order to
delegate this evaluation process would assure the proper assessment of the population

126
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needs. Discussion with the community should also assist the mission in creating
confidence while giving them the ability to adequately reply to the population’s requests.
However, as the person at MONUSCO explained, she was only going to the field a few
times a year.
Moreover, the missions should also not forget in their assessment the confidence
created between them and other partners and between these partners and the community.
Impact can only be properly assessed if all angles of the confidence-building system are
being analyzed. Also, improvement regarding effectiveness can only be achieved if the
missions acknowledge all the particularities of this system.
The main priority is to encompass the community as the main stakeholder.
Efficiency is worthy, however, the missions will never be effective if confidence is not at
the foundation of its work.
I regret that this analysis did not obtain more data to further define what could be
undertaken by the missions, however it raised the importance of putting the community
back at the center of the QIPs process, and raised the necessity for QIPs to not only build
confidence between the missions and the populations, but simply to create a circle of
common understanding and trust which would then become a real stepping stone for the
missions to achieve its mandate and develop a strong, stable, “healthy” society.
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